[Analysis] Personal Data Breach under the DPDP Act – Rule 7 Intimation | The Seventy-Two-Hour Clock | Rule 6(1) Safeguards
- Blog|Company Law|
- 20 Min Read
Personal data breach intimation under section 8(6) and Rule 7: the five elements owed to every affected Data Principal, the two-stage filing with the Board, when the seventy-two-hour clock starts, the seven minimum safeguards under Rule 6(1), and the penalty exposure under the Schedule.
- By Taxmann
- |
- Last Updated on 16 November, 2026
Table of Contents
- What counts as a personal data breach?
- What must be told to each affected Data Principal?
- What must be told to the Board, and when?
- When does the seventy-two-hour clock start?
- What do the two intimation templates contain?
- What security safeguards must already be in place?
- How do the DPDP and CERT-In log retention requirements interact?
- What is the penalty exposure?
- What must the response plan settle in advance?
- What does an auditor test, and what goes wrong?
- Quick answers
1. What counts as a personal data breach?
Section 2(u) defines a personal data breach as any unauthorised processing of personal data, or accidental disclosure, acquisition, sharing, use, alteration, destruction, or loss of access to personal data, that compromises the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of personal data (para 6.2).
The definition is broad, and the book says so plainly: it covers external attacks, insider misuse, accidental exposure, data corruption, and system outages that render personal data inaccessible (para 6.2).
That last category is the one organisations most often fail to classify as a breach. Because the definition reaches availability as well as confidentiality, a ransomware attack that encrypts personal data and renders it inaccessible is a personal data breach even if the data is never exfiltrated (para 6.1.4). So is a prolonged system failure that leaves personal data unreachable. Neither involves anyone seeing data they should not have seen.
There is no risk threshold in the Act. The notification obligations under section 8(6), operationalised in Rule 7, attach to a personal data breach as defined, not to a breach that is likely to cause harm (para 6.2). The book draws the contrast with the GDPR explicitly in the next section.
The triage that separates a security incident from a personal data breach in the first hours is covered in the post on the incident response plan under the DPDP Act.
2. What must be told to each affected Data Principal?
Rule 7(1) requires the Data Fiduciary, on becoming aware of any personal data breach, to intimate each affected Data Principal, to the best of its knowledge, in a concise, clear and plain manner and without delay, through the Data Principal’s user account or any mode of communication registered by her with the Data Fiduciary (para 6.2.1).
The intimation must include five prescribed elements (para 6.2.1):
| Element | Provision | What it covers |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Rule 7(1)(a) | A description of the breach, including its nature, extent and the timing of its occurrence |
| 2 | Rule 7(1)(b) | The consequences relevant to the Data Principal that are likely to arise from the breach |
| 3 | Rule 7(1)(c) | The measures implemented and being implemented by the Data Fiduciary, if any, to mitigate risk |
| 4 | Rule 7(1)(d) | The safety measures that the Data Principal may take to protect her interests |
| 5 | Rule 7(1)(e) | The business contact information of a person who is able to respond on behalf of the Data Fiduciary to queries raised by the Data Principal |
Two features of this obligation are stricter than the GDPR equivalent, and the book sets them side by side.
Under the GDPR, Article 34 requires notification to the data subject only where the breach is likely to result in a high risk to rights and freedoms, and then without undue delay. The DPDP Act requires notification to every affected Data Principal, without a risk threshold and without a defined period, other than the instruction that it must issue the notification without delay (para 6.2.1).
The practical consequence the book draws is a capability requirement rather than a drafting one: the Data Fiduciary must have a breach response capability that can identify affected Data Principals, draft the notification and deliver it through the appropriate channel within hours or days of becoming aware of the breach, rather than within weeks (para 6.2.1).
Identifying affected Data Principals quickly is the hard part of that sentence, and it depends on work done long before the incident. It depends on the data inventory and the data flow maps, which is one reason the book places those artefacts in the first ninety days of the compliance programme (para 12.1.2).
The channel is prescribed too: the Data Principal’s user account, or any mode of communication she has registered with the Data Fiduciary (para 6.2.1). A breach notice published only as a press release or a website banner does not discharge the obligation. Appendix A lists, among the evidence for this requirement, communication channel verification records and evidence of delivery such as email delivery receipts, in-app notification logs and SMS delivery reports (Appendix A, section 6).
3. What must be told to the Board, and when?
Rule 7(2) prescribes a two-stage notification process to the Board (para 6.2.2):
| Stage | Timing | Content |
|---|---|---|
| Initial intimation, Rule 7(2)(a) | Without delay, on becoming aware | A description of the breach, including its nature, extent, timing and location of occurrence, and the likely impact |
| Detailed report, Rule 7(2)(b) | Within seventy-two hours of becoming aware, or within such longer period as the Board may allow on a request made in writing | Updated and detailed information in respect of the breach description; the broad facts related to the events, circumstances and reasons leading to the breach; measures implemented or proposed, if any, to mitigate risk; any findings regarding the person who caused the breach; remedial measures taken to prevent recurrence; and a report regarding the intimations given to affected Data Principals |
The book explains what the first stage is for: the initial intimation serves as an alert that enables the Board to assess whether urgent remedial or mitigation measures are required under section 27(1)(a) (para 6.2.2). That connection matters, because section 27(1)(a) is one of the five triggers for Board action, and it means the organisation’s own report is capable of setting an inquiry in motion.
The sixth item in the detailed report is the one organisations under-prepare: a report regarding the intimations given to affected Data Principals. The Board is told not only what happened, but what the organisation told the people affected, and when. The two intimation workstreams therefore have to run in parallel from hour zero, with the Data Principal notifications logged in a form that can be reported to the Board within the same seventy-two hours.
The book works a full example through, which is the clearest way to see the sequencing. At 9:00 a.m. on Monday, an e-commerce company confirms that an unauthorised party accessed a customer database. Without delay, it notifies the affected Data Principals of the breach, describing the nature and extent of the personal data affected, the likely consequences, and the measures being taken. Separately, it promptly sends the Board the information then available, including the nature, extent, timing and likely impact of the breach. Investigation continues. Within seventy-two hours of becoming aware, the company provides the Board with the fuller Rule 7(2) information, including updated facts, the circumstances and causes identified, mitigation measures taken or proposed, findings concerning the person responsible where available, remedial steps to prevent recurrence, and a report on communications made to affected Data Principals. If it cannot provide part of the required information within that period, it should seek an extension from the Board in writing and explain the reasons for the delay (para 6.2.2).
Note the extension mechanism: it exists, it is available for the detailed report only, and it must be requested in writing. Appendix A lists the written request for extension, with the Board’s response, among the evidence items for this requirement (Appendix A, section 6).
4. When does the seventy-two-hour clock start?
At awareness. The book is emphatic on this point, because the alternative reading is both common and wrong.
The seventy-two-hour window, measured from the point at which the Data Fiduciary becomes aware of the breach, is one of the most operationally demanding timelines in the Act. “Becoming aware” is not the same as “confirming” or “completing the investigation.” An organisation that receives a credible alert from its intrusion detection system indicating that personal data has been exfiltrated has become aware of a breach at that moment, even if the full scope, the number of affected Data Principals, the categories of data compromised, and the root cause are not yet known. The clock starts at awareness, not at the conclusion of the investigation (para 6.2.2).
The Rules accommodate that reality rather than ignoring it. The initial intimation under Rule 7(2)(a), which must be made without delay and ahead of the seventy-two-hour detailed report, requires only a description of the breach and its likely impact, not a complete forensic analysis (para 6.2.2).
So the correct operating posture is to file early and thin, then supplement. The book reinforces the point with European enforcement experience. Over more than six years of GDPR operation under the equivalent seventy-two-hour deadline in Article 33, the most common compliance failures have related to late notification, where organisations failed to recognise the trigger event or delayed the clock; incomplete notification, where organisations provided insufficient detail at the seventy-two-hour mark; and failure to update, where organisations filed an initial notification but did not supplement it as the investigation progressed. Organisations preparing for the DPDP requirement should study these patterns and design their breach response workflows to address each failure mode (para 6.2.2).
Those three failure modes map onto three design decisions. Recognising the trigger requires a documented decision authority for classifying an event as a personal data breach. Filing complete information at seventy-two hours requires pre-drafted templates. Supplementing afterwards requires the incident record to stay open after the report is filed.
5. What do the two intimation templates contain?
The book supplies both, with the explicit recommendation that organisations pre-draft them and adapt them to specific breach circumstances at the time of an incident, rather than drafting from scratch under time pressure (para 6.3.3).
Figure 6.1, the Data Principal breach intimation under Rule 7(1), is structured as a message with a subject line of “Important Notice Regarding Your Personal Data”, a salutation, an opening that states a personal data breach may affect the recipient’s personal data held by the Data Fiduciary, and then five numbered sections mapping to the five prescribed elements (para 6.3.3):
| Section | Content |
|---|---|
| 1. Description of the breach [Rule 7(1)(a)] | The date of awareness, the nature and extent of the breach, when it occurred, and what it affected, for example customer records including names, email addresses and mobile numbers |
| 2. Likely consequences [Rule 7(1)(b)] | The consequences relevant to the Data Principal, for example that her name, email address and mobile number may have been accessed by an unauthorised third party, which may result in unsolicited communications or phishing attempts directed at her |
| 3. Measures taken [Rule 7(1)(c)] | The mitigation measures, for example revoking compromised access credentials, engaging a cybersecurity firm to conduct a forensic investigation, and implementing additional access controls to prevent recurrence |
| 4. Steps you may take [Rule 7(1)(d)] | The protective measures, for example changing the password on the platform, being cautious of unsolicited emails or messages requesting personal information, and monitoring accounts for unusual activity |
| 5. Contact for queries [Rule 7(1)(e)] | Name, title, email and phone of a person able to respond on behalf of the Data Fiduciary |
It closes with a line regretting any concern caused and stating the commitment to protecting personal data (para 6.3.3).
Figure 6.2, the Board initial intimation under Rule 7(2)(a), is structured as a filing addressed to the Data Protection Board of India, from the Data Fiduciary with its registration or identification details, dated, and headed “Intimation of Personal Data Breach under Rule 7(2)(a)”, with five numbered fields (para 6.3.3):
| Field | Content |
|---|---|
| 1. Description of the breach | Nature, for example unauthorised access, accidental disclosure or ransomware attack |
| 2. Extent | Number and categories of Data Principals affected, and categories of personal data compromised |
| 3. Timing | Date and time of occurrence, or the estimated period |
| 4. Location | Systems, databases or facilities affected |
| 5. Likely impact | Assessment of consequences, covering confidentiality, integrity or availability compromise, and potential harm to Data Principals |
It then states that a detailed report under Rule 7(2)(b) will be furnished within seventy-two hours of becoming aware of the breach, or alternatively requests an extension of a stated period with reasons, and closes with the signature of the DPO or authorised signatory and contact details (para 6.3.3).
The filing format follows the Board’s digital office mandate. Section 28(1) requires the Board to function as a digital office, and Rule 20 provides that it may adopt techno-legal measures to conduct proceedings without requiring the physical presence of any individual (para 14.1), so both the intimation and any later evidence are submitted digitally.
6. What security safeguards must already be in place?
Section 8(5) states the governing duty: a Data Fiduciary must protect personal data in its possession or control by taking reasonable security safeguards to prevent a personal data breach. Rule 6(1) translates that general obligation into seven minimum requirements that every Data Fiduciary must implement (paras 1.7 and 6.1).
The book is careful about what “minimum” means here, and the point is worth quoting in substance because it cuts both ways. The seven requirements represent a floor, not a ceiling. A Data Fiduciary that implements all seven but does so inadequately, for example by deploying encryption that relies on deprecated algorithms or by maintaining access control lists that have not been reviewed in years, may nonetheless fail the reasonableness standard. Conversely, a Data Fiduciary that implements additional safeguards beyond the seven but fails to implement one of the enumerated requirements is in breach of Rule 6(1) regardless of the strength of its overall security posture. The seven requirements are individually mandatory (para 6.1).
| Rule | Requirement | What it demands in practice |
|---|---|---|
| 6(1)(a) | Encryption, obfuscation, masking or virtual tokens | At least one of the four techniques, or a combination, applied to personal data. Encryption for data at rest and in transit; obfuscation or synthetic data for development and testing environments; masking for customer-facing displays; virtual tokens in payment and identity systems. No algorithm or key length is prescribed |
| 6(1)(b) | Access controls | Control of access to the computer resources used by the Data Fiduciary or Data Processor. In practice a role-based framework in which each role has permissions commensurate with its functions and no broader, which is the principle of least privilege |
| 6(1)(c) | Logging, monitoring and review | Visibility on the accessing of personal data, to enable detection of unauthorised access, its investigation, and remediation to prevent recurrence. Logs as the raw data, monitoring as the analytical layer, review as the human judgment layer |
| 6(1)(d) | Business continuity and data backups | Reasonable measures for continued processing where confidentiality, integrity or availability is compromised, including by failed data backups. Backup frequency, geographic separation, encryption of backup media, and tested restoration |
| 6(1)(e) | One-year log retention | Retention of logs and personal data for one year, unless compliance with any law in force requires otherwise, for detection, investigation, remediation and continued processing |
| 6(1)(f) | Contractual provisions with Data Processors | Appropriate provision in the contract with the Data Processor, wherever applicable, for taking reasonable security safeguards |
| 6(1)(g) | Technical and organisational measures for security observance | The governance, training, testing and review mechanisms needed to ensure the preceding six are continuously maintained and improved, not merely implemented at a point in time |
Three of the seven deserve a line of elaboration because of how they fail.
On logging, the effectiveness of the detection chain depends on the completeness of the logs. The book’s warning: logs that record only successful authentication events but not failed attempts, or that record access to application front-ends but not to underlying databases, create blind spots that an adversary or an insider can exploit without detection. Logging should cover all access points to personal data, at application, database, file system and network layers, with logs transmitted to a centralised monitoring system where cross-system correlation is possible (para 6.1.3).
On backups, the obligation extends beyond creating them. An organisation that creates daily backups but has never tested whether those backups can be restored to a functioning system within an acceptable timeframe has not implemented a reasonable measure for continued processing; it has implemented a measure that may or may not work when required (para 6.1.4).
On processor contracts, a Data Processing Agreement that covers the scope of processing, the data categories and the commercial terms but is silent on the specific security measures the Data Processor must implement does not satisfy Rule 6(1)(f). The provisions should require the Data Processor to implement measures consistent with Rule 6(1)(a) to (e), to notify the Data Fiduciary without delay on becoming aware of any personal data breach, to cooperate with the Data Fiduciary’s breach investigation and notification obligations, and to provide evidence of compliance on request, with periodic audit rights to enable verification over the life of the engagement (para 6.1.6).
That last requirement is the hinge between the safeguards and the breach timeline. If a processor does not tell the Data Fiduciary without delay, the Data Fiduciary cannot meet a clock that starts at awareness.
7. How do the DPDP and CERT-In log retention requirements interact?
Cumulatively, not alternatively, and the book recommends one architecture to satisfy both.
Rule 6(1)(e) requires retention of logs and personal data for one year. Rule 8(3) reinforces the requirement from a different angle: the Data Fiduciary shall retain personal data, associated traffic data and other logs of processing for a minimum period of one year from the date of such processing, for the purposes specified in the Seventh Schedule, after which it shall cause such data and logs to be erased unless further retention is required for compliance with any other law or as notified by the Government (para 6.1.5).
Separately, the Directions issued by CERT-In on 28 April 2022 under section 70B(6) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 require covered entities to maintain logs of ICT systems for a rolling period of one hundred and eighty days and to retain those logs within the territory of India (para 6.4).
The book’s reading: these obligations should be viewed as cumulative rather than alternative. The DPDP Rules extend the retention period to twelve months, while the CERT-In Directions introduce an India-location requirement for the applicable retention window. For most organisations, the practical solution is a single log management architecture that retains twelve months of logs within India. A unified design is operationally simpler, reduces governance complexity, and satisfies the requirements of both frameworks more effectively than maintaining separate retention arrangements for different regulatory purposes (para 6.4).
There is one further interaction, with the erasure obligation, that is easy to get backwards. Section 8(7) requires the Data Fiduciary to erase personal data when the specified purpose is no longer being served. But Rule 8(3) requires logs and associated personal data to be retained for at least one year for security and accountability purposes, regardless of whether the specified purpose has been fulfilled earlier. The book’s illustration: an e-commerce platform that fulfils a customer order within three days cannot erase the associated personal data and processing logs immediately upon fulfilment; it must retain the data and logs for at least one year, and after that period, if no other law requires continued retention, they must be erased (para 6.1.5).
On architecture, the one-year minimum must be reflected in the log management design: the sources of logs across application, database, authentication, network traffic and security events; the transport mechanism for collecting logs from distributed sources into a centralised repository; the storage infrastructure for twelve months of log volume; the integrity controls preventing tampering with stored logs; and the retention and deletion policies ensuring logs are retained for the prescribed minimum and erased thereafter unless another law requires longer. Organisations already operating Security Information and Event Management systems will find these provide the centralised collection, storage and analysis capabilities required by Rule 6(1)(c) and the retention capabilities required by Rule 6(1)(e); organisations without them must assess whether the volume and sensitivity of personal data processed justifies the investment, or whether centralised log storage on dedicated servers with access controls and integrity monitoring is sufficient. That assessment, typically owned by information security working with the DPO or compliance function, should be documented as part of the technical and organisational measures adopted under Rule 6(1)(g) (para 6.3.4).
8. What is the penalty exposure?
The two highest ceilings in the Act sit in this area (paras 6.3 and 14.4):
| Breach | Maximum penalty |
|---|---|
| Failure to take reasonable security safeguards under section 8(5) | Up to Rs. 250 crore |
| Failure to give the Board or the affected Data Principal notice of a personal data breach under section 8(6) | Up to Rs. 200 crore |
These are maximum amounts. Section 33(1) engages the penalty power only where the Board determines the breach to be significant, and section 33(2) requires the Board to calibrate the actual penalty against seven factors: the nature, gravity and duration of the breach; the type and nature of the personal data affected; the repetitive nature of the breach; whether the person has realised a gain or avoided a loss as a result; whether the person took action to mitigate the effects and consequences, and the timeliness and effectiveness of such action; whether the penalty is proportionate and effective; and the likely impact of the penalty on the person (paras 6.3 and 14.4).
The book’s reading of what that framework rewards is the most actionable paragraph in the chapter. An organisation that has implemented all seven minimum safeguards under Rule 6(1), has conducted periodic security assessments, has maintained an incident response plan, has notified the Board and affected Data Principals within the prescribed timelines, has cooperated with the Board’s inquiry and has taken effective remedial action will present a materially different risk profile from an organisation that has implemented few safeguards, has no incident response capability, has delayed notification and has not cooperated. The former may face a modest penalty or none at all; the latter faces the prospect of a penalty approaching the statutory maximum (para 6.3).
In other words, the conduct after the breach is itself a priced variable. Two of the seven calibration factors, mitigation and its timeliness, and proportionality and deterrence, respond directly to how the response was run.
9. What must the response plan settle in advance?
Who classifies the event, who notifies, who investigates, and what they send. Taxmann’s Digital Personal Data Protection says the breach response workflow must be designed to operate within the Rule 7 timelines, which means these are fixed before an incident rather than during one: the decision authority for classifying an event as a personal data breach, the notification authority for intimating the Board and Data Principals, and the investigation authority for conducting the forensic analysis; the escalation path to senior management and the board; the templates for the Data Principal intimation and for both stages of the Board intimation; and the protocols for coordinating with Data Processors, law enforcement and external forensic advisors (para 6.3.2).
The plan should be tested at least annually through tabletop exercises covering an external attack, an insider compromise, an accidental disclosure and a Data Processor breach, with the results and corrective actions documented. The book’s reason is evidentiary: an organisation that can show in a Board proceeding that it maintained the plan, tested it and activated it effectively is in a materially stronger position under the section 33(2) calibration factors than one that improvised its response after the breach (para 6.3.2).
Ahead of the plan sits the gap assessment against Rule 6(1)(a) to (g), conducted system by system rather than for the organisation as a whole, and producing a remediation plan with prioritised actions, timelines and owners, approved at the appropriate level of management (para 6.3.1).
How to build the plan itself, staff the response team, run the phases of response and keep the incident register is covered in the post on the incident response plan under the DPDP Act. Where the templates and the tabletop programme have to be built rather than described, including compliance SOPs and automation of compliances, Taxmann Advisory provides implementation support. Training the people who will run the workflow is itself part of the technical and organisational measures required by section 8(4) and Rule 6(1)(g), and role-specific sessions, live or recorded, run on Taxmann.com | Learning.
10. What does an auditor test, and what goes wrong?
The test programme for this area runs through each of the seven Rule 6(1) requirements and then the breach response capability (para 6.5):
| Requirement | What the auditor will test |
|---|---|
| 6(1)(a) Encryption and masking | Whether personal data at rest and in transit is protected by current-standard encryption, and whether test and development environments use obfuscated or synthetic data |
| 6(1)(b) Access controls | Whether role-based access is implemented, whether periodic access reviews are conducted, and whether terminated or transferred accounts are promptly deactivated |
| 6(1)(c) Logging | Whether access logs cover all layers, application, database and network, whether logs are transmitted to centralised monitoring, and whether automated alerts exist for anomalous access patterns |
| 6(1)(d) Backups | Whether backup frequency, geographic separation, encryption and restoration testing are documented |
| 6(1)(e) Log retention | Whether logs are retained for one year minimum per Rule 6(1)(e) and Rule 8(3) |
| 6(1)(f) Processor contracts | Whether security provisions are included per Rule 6(1)(f) |
| 6(1)(g) Organisational measures | Whether security policies exist, training is conducted and periodic reviews are performed |
| Breach response | Whether a documented breach response plan exists, whether it has been tested through tabletop exercises, whether notification templates are pre-drafted, and whether the seventy-two-hour Board notification timeline is achievable |
The evidence to have ready: encryption configuration documentation; the access control matrix with its last review date; sample access review reports; SIEM or log management platform configuration; the backup policy with restoration test results; Data Processor contracts with security clauses highlighted; security training completion records; the breach response plan with version history; tabletop exercise reports with findings and corrective actions; and pre-drafted notification templates for Data Principal and Board intimation (para 6.5).
The five findings the book reports as recurring (para 6.5):
| Finding | What it looks like |
|---|---|
| Partial encryption | Encryption applied to production databases but not to backup media or test environments containing real personal data |
| Stale access control lists | Access control lists not reviewed since initial configuration, leaving stale permissions for departed or reassigned employees |
| Short log retention | Logs retained for less than one year due to storage cost constraints |
| Untested breach plan | A breach response plan exists but has never been tested through a tabletop exercise |
| No pre-drafted Board template | The team would draft the Board notification from scratch under seventy-two-hour pressure |
The access control finding has a well-documented analogue in European enforcement, which the book sets out at length. In 2018 Portugal’s data protection authority, the CNPD, investigated Centro Hospitalar Barreiro Montijo after concerns arose about access to patients’ electronic clinical records. The investigation found that nine of the hospital’s ten Social Work professionals had been assigned doctor-level access profiles, granting unrestricted access to complete clinical records without limitation by patient, episode or time period, access that also extended to Portugal’s national Health Data Platform. The hospital further had 985 active doctor profiles against only 296 identified doctors, with no documented rules linking job roles to access permissions, no controlled account-creation process and no reliable review mechanism. The CNPD rejected the hospital’s argument that its systems were supplied by the Ministry of Health’s shared-services provider, holding that the hospital remained responsible for limiting access to what each professional needed. It found violations of the GDPR principles of data minimisation and integrity and confidentiality, and imposed fines totalling EUR 400,000 (para 6.1.2).
The parallel to Rule 6(1)(b) and section 8(1) is direct. Outsourcing the system does not outsource the responsibility for who can see what.
11. Quick answers
What is a personal data breach under the DPDP Act?
Section 2(u) defines it as any unauthorised processing of personal data, or accidental disclosure, acquisition, sharing, use, alteration, destruction or loss of access to personal data, that compromises the confidentiality, integrity or availability of personal data. The definition covers external attacks, insider misuse, accidental exposure, data corruption and system outages that render personal data inaccessible. Because availability is included, a ransomware attack is a personal data breach even if no data is exfiltrated.
What is the seventy-two-hour rule under the DPDP Rules?
Rule 7(2) requires two filings with the Data Protection Board. The first, without delay on becoming aware, describes the breach including its nature, extent, timing and location of occurrence and the likely impact. The second, within seventy-two hours of becoming aware or within such longer period as the Board may allow on written request, provides updated and detailed information: the broad facts of the events, circumstances and reasons; measures implemented or proposed to mitigate risk; findings regarding the person who caused the breach; remedial measures to prevent recurrence; and a report on the intimations given to affected Data Principals.
When does the seventy-two-hour clock start?
At the point of becoming aware of the breach, not at the point of confirming it or completing the investigation. Taxmann’s Digital Personal Data Protection is explicit: an organisation that receives a credible alert from its intrusion detection system indicating that personal data has been exfiltrated has become aware at that moment, even if the scope, the number of affected Data Principals, the categories of data and the root cause are not yet known.
What must a data breach notification to Data Principals contain?
Five elements under Rule 7(1): a description of the breach including its nature, extent and the timing of its occurrence; the consequences relevant to the Data Principal likely to arise; the measures implemented and being implemented to mitigate risk; the safety measures the Data Principal may take to protect her interests; and the business contact information of a person able to respond to her queries. The intimation must be concise, clear and plain, sent without delay, and delivered through her user account or a mode of communication she has registered.
Does the DPDP Act have a harm threshold for breach notification?
No. Unlike GDPR Article 34, which requires notification to the data subject only where the breach is likely to result in a high risk to rights and freedoms, Rule 7(1) requires intimation to every affected Data Principal without a risk threshold. The practical consequence is a capability requirement: the organisation must be able to identify affected Data Principals, draft the notification and deliver it within hours or days of becoming aware.
What are the seven security safeguards under Rule 6(1)?
Encryption, obfuscation, masking or virtual tokens under Rule 6(1)(a); access controls on computer resources under Rule 6(1)(b); logging, monitoring and review under Rule 6(1)(c); business continuity and data backups under Rule 6(1)(d); retention of logs and personal data for one year under Rule 6(1)(e); contractual provisions with Data Processors for reasonable security safeguards under Rule 6(1)(f); and technical and organisational measures to ensure effective observance of the safeguards under Rule 6(1)(g). Each is individually mandatory.
How long must logs be kept under the DPDP Rules?
One year minimum. Rule 6(1)(e) requires retention of logs and personal data for one year unless another law requires otherwise, and Rule 8(3) requires retention of personal data, associated traffic data and other logs of processing for a minimum of one year from the date of processing, after which they must be erased unless further retention is required by law or notified by the Government. The CERT-In Directions of 28 April 2022 separately require 180 days of ICT system logs held within India, and Taxmann’s Digital Personal Data Protection treats the two as cumulative, recommending a single architecture retaining twelve months of logs within India.
This article draws on Chapter 6 of Taxmann’s Digital Personal Data Protection – An Essential Guide to India’s DPDP Law by CA Narasimhan Elangovan (2026 Edition), which examines the seven minimum security safeguards under Rule 6(1), the definition of a personal data breach, the Rule 7(1) and Rule 7(2) intimation obligations with pre-drafted templates in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, the log retention architecture, the interaction with the CERT-In Directions, and the audit considerations for this chapter. It also draws on Chapter 14 and Appendix A on the penalty framework and the evidence a breach file should contain. Law stated as updated till 15 September 2026.
The DPDP Act, 2023, the DPDP Rules, 2025 and the notifications of 13 November 2025 are available on Taxmann.com | Research under Indian Acts and Rules.
Related reading: data privacy breach, enforcement and penalties under the DPDP Act · obligations of Data Fiduciaries · the DPDP Act compared with the IT Act · the DPDP Act compliance checklist for businesses.
More in this series: the Data Protection Board of India · how a DPDP compliance audit is conducted · Significant Data Fiduciary obligations · Consent Managers under the DPDP framework · handling Data Principal rights requests · Data Fiduciary, Data Processor or both · children’s data and verifiable parental consent · the SPDI Rules and the DPDP Act · the Record of Processing Activities (ROPA) · the incident response plan · data retention and erasure · the privacy notice under Rule 3 · the data processing agreement · data localisation and cross-border transfers · employee data and workplace monitoring · exemptions under the DPDP Act · legitimate uses under section 7.
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