[Analysis] Legitimate Uses under the DPDP Act – Section 7 Explained | Processing Without Consent | Legitimate Interest Compared
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Section 7 of the DPDP Act explained: nine legitimate uses that allow processing without consent, from deemed consent to State benefits and emergencies, and how they differ from legitimate interest.
- By Taxmann
- |
- Last Updated on 15 November, 2026
Table of Contents
- What are legitimate uses under the DPDP Act?
- How does voluntary provision under section 7(a) work?
- How do legitimate uses differ from legitimate interest under the GDPR?
- When can the State process data without consent?
- Which legal obligations and court orders allow processing?
- What about medical emergencies, epidemics and disasters?
- Does a legitimate use free a business from the rest of the Act?
- Quick answers
1. What are legitimate uses under the DPDP Act?
They are the second of the two grounds on which the DPDP Act allows personal data to be processed. Section 4(1) permits processing for a lawful purpose, either on the basis of consent under clause (a) or for certain legitimate uses under clause (b). Consent is therefore not the only route. Section 7 then lists nine legitimate uses, from clause (a) to clause (i). Like most of the Act’s substantive provisions, it applies from 13 May 2027.
| Clause | Legitimate use | Who may rely on it |
|---|---|---|
| 7(a) | The specified purpose for which the Data Principal voluntarily provided her personal data, where she has not indicated that she does not consent to its use | Any person |
| 7(b) | Providing or issuing a prescribed subsidy, benefit, service, certificate, licence or permit, where the person earlier consented to State processing for any such benefit or the data is in a State database or register notified by the Central Government | The State and its instrumentalities |
| 7(c) | Performing any function under Indian law, or in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India or the security of the State | The State and its instrumentalities |
| 7(d) | Fulfilling a legal obligation to disclose information to the State or its instrumentalities | Any person under that obligation |
| 7(e) | Complying with a judgment, decree or order under Indian law, or a foreign judgment or order on a contractual or civil claim | Any person |
| 7(f) | Responding to a medical emergency involving a threat to life or an immediate threat to health | Any person |
| 7(g) | Providing medical treatment or health services during an epidemic, outbreak of disease or other threat to public health | Any person |
| 7(h) | Ensuring safety or providing assistance or services during a disaster or a breakdown of public order | Any person |
| 7(i) | Employment, or safeguarding the employer from loss or liability | Any person |
Most data protection laws, including the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the DPDP Act, recognise that some processing can be lawful without consent. Abha Tiwari and Aditya Singhania explain why a law needs grounds other than consent. If consent were the only basis, every routine and unavoidable act of processing, such as paying an employee, issuing an invoice or keeping a record a statute requires, would depend on permission the individual could withdraw at any moment. Consent would also lose its meaning, because people would learn to click through it. As the authors put it, “a law that recognises only consent tends to produce worse privacy, not better.”
2. How does voluntary provision under section 7(a) work?
Section 7(a) permits processing for the specified purpose for which a Data Principal voluntarily provided her personal data, where she has not indicated that she does not consent to its use. The authors describe it as deemed consent. Two features matter. The processing is bounded by the purpose for which the data was given, not by the fact of giving it. And the permission can be withdrawn at any time, by indicating that she does not consent.
The Act gives two illustrations. X makes a purchase at a pharmacy and asks it to send a receipt to her mobile phone; the pharmacy may process her data to send the receipt. X asks a real estate broker for help finding rented accommodation and shares her data for that purpose; the broker may process it to find and tell her about suitable homes, but must stop once she says she no longer needs his help. The second illustration shows the clause working in both directions: the disclosure permits processing while the purpose lasts, and the permission ends when the purpose does.
The same reasoning applies whenever someone supplies personal data while asking for something, such as a customer quoting a booking reference to a support desk, an applicant sending a CV for a specific vacancy or a citizen writing to a government office about a grievance. In each case the processing is limited to what is needed to respond.
Section 7(a) is not an Indian version of the third-party doctrine that the US Supreme Court built in United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland, under which a person who discloses information to someone else keeps no privacy interest in it. Indian law has taken the opposite view. In District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad v. Canara Bank, the Supreme Court of India held that a customer’s documents held by a bank remain confidential even though they were voluntarily sent to the bank, because privacy attaches to persons, not places. Section 7(a) follows that principle: it treats the individual as keeping an interest in what she has handed over, so the pharmacy asked to send a receipt has no basis to send advertising.
3. How do legitimate uses differ from legitimate interest under the GDPR?
In four ways, and the similar names are misleading. The GDPR recognises six lawful bases, of which legitimate interests is the most flexible: in principle it can support any processing carried out for a reasonable purpose, but the controller must identify the interest, show the processing is necessary and weigh the interest against the individual’s rights. The DPDP Act recognises only two bases, consent under section 6 and the legitimate uses in section 7, and has no legitimate interests ground.
| Point | Legitimate interests (GDPR) | Legitimate uses (DPDP Act) |
|---|---|---|
| Scope | Open: any processing for a reasonable purpose | Closed: only the situations listed in section 7 |
| Balancing | Required: purpose, necessity and balance, documented by the controller | None: where a purpose falls within the list, the ground applies categorically |
| Right to object | Yes, under Article 21 | No counterpart |
| Notice | The interest relied on must be stated in the privacy notice under Article 13(1)(d) | No statutory notice, because the notice duty in section 5 is triggered by a request for consent |
The closed list cuts both ways. A Data Fiduciary cannot construct a legitimate use of its own by weighing its interests against the Data Principal’s, as the European provision allows. If a purpose falls outside section 7, the ground is unavailable however reasonable the purpose. But where a purpose does fall within the list, the organisation does not have to show that its interest outweighs the individual’s, and there is no assessment for a regulator to examine afterwards.
4. When can the State process data without consent?
Under two clauses. Section 7(b) is the welfare ground. The State and its instrumentalities may process personal data to provide or issue a subsidy, benefit, service, certificate, licence or permit where the person has previously consented to processing by the State for any such benefit, or where the data is held in a database, register, book or other document maintained by the State and notified by the Central Government. The rationale is scale: requiring a fresh consent at each disbursement would be unworkable, and would fail the people the schemes exist for, since those least able to deal with a consent screen often depend on the benefit most. For example, a pregnant woman who enrols on a government application for a maternity benefits programme may have her data processed to determine her eligibility for any other prescribed benefit.
The clause is narrower than it first appears:
- the benefits and permits covered are those prescribed, so the scope is fixed by rules rather than by the Act;
- welfare or regulatory functions outside those categories cannot use the ground; and
- the purpose must be lawful, because processing beyond what the law envisages is not saved by calling it a legitimate use.
Rule 5 of the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025 (DPDP Rules) applies the standards in the Second Schedule to this processing. Among them, the Data Principal must receive an intimation, with the business contact details of a person who can answer questions and the means of exercising her rights. That restores a limited version of the notice duty, though it is an intimation with contact details rather than the itemised privacy notice required by Rule 3.
Section 7(c) covers the performance by the State of any function under Indian law, or processing in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India or the security of the State. The first limb is bounded by the law conferring the function. The second is not tied to any statutory function, mirrors the grounds in Article 19(2) of the Constitution without its requirement of reasonableness, and contains no express test of necessity or proportionality. In Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, the Supreme Court observed that the State may have an interest in placing reasonable limits on informational privacy in the interests of national security and the security of the State. That constitutional standard still binds the State whatever the Act permits, so processing under section 7(c) must be lawful, pursue a legitimate aim and be proportionate.
5. Which legal obligations and court orders allow processing?
Section 7(d) covers processing to fulfil an obligation under Indian law to disclose information to the State or its instrumentalities. It is aimed at the person under the disclosure duty, not at the State receiving the information, and the processing must follow the disclosure provisions of the other law. The Collection of Statistics Act, 2008 is one example: an informant who receives a written request is bound to furnish the information. Tax and financial regulation is another. These frameworks often require private information to be disclosed, but such a requirement does not entitle disclosure to all comers, and data protection rules suited to the purpose of the processing still apply.
Section 7(e) covers compliance with any judgment, decree or order under Indian law, and with any judgment or order on a contractual or civil claim under a foreign law. The second limb is deliberately narrower: domestic judgments qualify whatever their subject, foreign ones only on contractual or civil claims, so a foreign criminal judgment does not support processing on this ground. The Act defines none of these terms and does not name the issuing authority, so orders of quasi-judicial as well as judicial bodies appear able to support processing. GPS tracking imposed as a condition of bail may be supported by section 7(e), as compliance with an order under Indian law. In State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjeev Kumar Chawla, the Delhi High Court observed that investigating agencies and the government ought to consider technological means of tracking undertrials where the State fears an accused may abscond.
6. What about medical emergencies, epidemics and disasters?
Three clauses cover them. Section 7(f) permits processing without consent to respond to a medical emergency involving a threat to life, or an immediate threat to health, of the Data Principal or any other individual. In an emergency there is often no time to seek consent and the person may be unable to give it, so requiring it would delay treatment rather than protect anyone. Because the clause extends to any other individual, a doctor may process one person’s data to save another.
Section 7(g) covers medical treatment and health services during an epidemic, an outbreak of disease or any other threat to public health. The difference from section 7(f) is one of scale: it responds to a threat to the population and covers activities such as contact tracing, case management and the distribution of treatment, which cannot practicably run on an opt-in basis. The GDPR reaches a similar result through Article 9(2)(i), but the European provisions require a legal basis in EU or Member State law and specific safeguards, and section 7(g) requires neither on its face. The GDPR also treats health data as a special category; the DPDP Act has no such category, so health information receives no heightened statutory protection once processing is permitted.
Section 7(h) covers measures to ensure safety or provide assistance during a disaster or a breakdown of public order. Disaster is defined in section 2(d) of the Disaster Management Act, 2005, but “breakdown of public order” is not defined in the DPDP Act, which leaves that second trigger considerably less certain.
7. Does a legitimate use free a business from the rest of the Act?
No. A legitimate use removes the need for consent and nothing else, and it should not be confused with the exemptions under section 17, which switch off obligations. The authors make the point using section 7(f): everything outside the consent machinery continues to apply. The Data Fiduciary remains responsible for compliance under section 8(1), must make reasonable efforts to keep the data accurate and complete under section 8(3), must maintain reasonable security safeguards under section 8(5) and Rule 6, must report a breach under section 8(6) and Rule 7, and must erase the data under section 8(7) once the purpose is served and no law requires retention. The Data Principal keeps her rights under Chapter III.
For emergencies, they draw two practical consequences. Processing must stay within the emergency purpose, so data accessed to treat a patient may not be reused for research, marketing or administration without a separate basis. And the data must be kept only as long as it is needed and then securely disposed of.
Notice works differently. Because section 5 ties the notice to a request for consent, processing under section 7 attracts no statutory notice, apart from the intimation the Second Schedule requires for section 7(b). For employee data processed under section 7(i), the authors recommend giving a notice anyway, as discussed in employee data and workplace monitoring, because processing that people cannot reasonably anticipate cannot be fair.
8. Quick answers
What are legitimate uses under the DPDP Act?
They are the nine situations listed in section 7 in which personal data may be processed without consent, including voluntary provision for a purpose, State benefits and functions, legal disclosure duties, court orders, medical emergencies, epidemics, disasters and employment.
What is deemed consent under the DPDP Act?
Abha Tiwari and Aditya Singhania use the label for section 7(a): processing for the specified purpose for which a person voluntarily provided her data, as long as she has not indicated that she does not consent. The permission ends when the purpose does, or earlier if she withdraws it.
Is legitimate interest a ground for processing in India?
No. The DPDP Act recognises only consent and the legitimate uses in section 7. Unlike legitimate interests under the GDPR, section 7 is a closed list with no balancing test.
Do legitimate uses require a privacy notice?
Not by statute, because the notice duty in section 5 is triggered by a request for consent. The Second Schedule requires an intimation for State processing under section 7(b), and the authors recommend a notice for employees.
Can a hospital process patient data without consent in an emergency?
Yes. Section 7(f) allows processing to respond to a medical emergency involving a threat to life or an immediate threat to health, of the patient or of any other person. The other duties of the Act, such as security and erasure, still apply.
Is processing under section 7 exempt from the DPDP Act?
No. Section 7 removes only the need for consent. Exemptions are a separate matter, dealt with in section 17.
When does section 7 come into force?
Section 7 applies from 13 May 2027, the date on which sections 7 to 10 of the DPDP Act and Rule 5 of the DPDP Rules come into force.
Chapter 6 of Digital Personal Data Protection Law Practice and Compliance by Abha Tiwari and Aditya Singhania examines lawful processing beyond consent: each of the nine legitimate uses in section 7, the comparison with legitimate interests under the GDPR, the standards in Rule 5 and the Second Schedule for State processing, and processing for employment purposes.
Taxmann.com | Research carries the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 section by section under Indian Acts & Rules, and Taxmann.com | Store has the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 with Rules – Bare Act with Section Notes.
Related reading: lawful processing and consent · the DPDP Act and the GDPR compared · the DPDP Act in healthcare · rights of Data Principals.
More in this series: the SPDI Rules and the DPDP Act · the Record of Processing Activities (ROPA) · the incident response plan · data retention and erasure · the privacy notice under Rule 3 · the data processing agreement · data localisation and cross-border transfers · employee data and workplace monitoring · exemptions under the DPDP Act · the Data Protection Board of India · how a DPDP compliance audit is conducted · Significant Data Fiduciary obligations · Consent Managers under the DPDP framework · personal data breach intimation under Rule 7 · handling Data Principal rights requests · Data Fiduciary, Data Processor or both · children’s data and verifiable parental consent.
Law stated as updated till October 2026.
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