[Analysis] Children’s Personal Data under the DPDP Act – Verifiable Parental Consent | Section 9(3) Prohibitions | Fourth Schedule Exemptions

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Processing children’s personal data under section 9 and Rules 10 to 12: verifiable parental consent and the two verification pathways, the categorical prohibitions on tracking, behavioural monitoring and targeted advertising, the five exempt classes and six exempt purposes in the Fourth Schedule, and guardian verification for persons with disability under Rule 11.

  • By Taxmann
  • |
  • Last Updated on 16 November, 2026
A child under the DPDP Act is anyone who has not completed eighteen years of age, which means the obligation reaches the vast majority of consumer-facing digital services. Before any processing of a child’s personal data begins, section 9(1) requires verifiable consent of the parent, and Rule 10 sets two pathways for verifying that the person consenting is an identifiable adult. Two further prohibitions apply regardless of consent: processing likely to cause a detrimental effect on a child’s well-being under section 9(2), and tracking, behavioural monitoring or targeted advertising directed at children under section 9(3). Taxmann’s Digital Personal Data Protection records the finding that recurs most often: section 9(3) compliance exists as a policy directive to the advertising team, with no system-level enforcement. The penalty ceiling for breach of the children’s obligations is Rs. 200 crore.

Table of Contents

  1. Who is a child under the DPDP Act?
  2. What must happen before a child’s personal data is processed?
  3. How is parental status verified?
  4. What is prohibited outright, regardless of consent?
  5. Which classes of Data Fiduciary are exempt?
  6. Which purposes are exempt?
  7. Can a Data Fiduciary obtain a lower age threshold?
  8. How does this work for persons with disability?
  9. How should age-gating and verification be designed?
  10. What record should each verification leave?
  11. What does an auditor test, and what goes wrong?
  12. Quick answers

1. Who is a child under the DPDP Act?

Section 2(f) defines a child as an individual who has not completed the age of eighteen years (Glossary).

That threshold is higher than the equivalent in several other regimes, and the consequence is reach. The book states it directly: given the definition of a child as an individual who has not completed eighteen years of age, any platform accessible to children includes the vast majority of consumer-facing digital services (para 7.3).

The definition of Data Principal extends accordingly. Section 2(j) defines the Data Principal as the individual to whom the personal data relates, and where such individual is a child, includes the parents or lawful guardian. When the Act refers to the consent of a Data Principal who is a child, it means the consent of the parent or lawful guardian (paras 2.5 and Glossary).

What amounts to processing a child’s personal data is also broader than many organisations assume. A child’s personal data is digitally processed whenever information identifying or relating to the child is handled in digital form. The book’s illustration: an educational gaming platform that creates a child’s profile using the child’s name, age, parent’s contact details, learning progress and game play history is processing the child’s personal data (para 7.1).

2. What must happen before a child’s personal data is processed?

Verifiable parental consent, obtained before the processing begins.

Section 9(1) provides that the Data Fiduciary shall, before processing any personal data of a child or a person with disability who has a lawful guardian, obtain verifiable consent of the parent of such child or the lawful guardian, as the case may be, in such manner as may be prescribed. The Explanation to section 9(1) clarifies that the expression “consent of the parent” includes the consent of a lawful guardian, wherever applicable (para 7.1).

The book emphasises that this is a precondition rather than a parallel requirement: no processing of a child’s personal data may take place until verifiable consent has been obtained from a parent (para 7.1).

It is also a stricter standard than the general consent requirement. Section 6(1) prescribes the attributes of valid consent but does not require verification of the identity or status of the person giving it. Section 9(1) does (para 7.1).

Rule 10(1) operationalises the verification requirement. The Data Fiduciary shall adopt appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure that verifiable consent of the parent is obtained, and shall observe due diligence for checking that the individual identifying herself as the parent is an adult who is identifiable if required in connection with compliance with any law for the time being in force in India (para 7.1).

Note what the due diligence is directed at. It is a check that the consenting individual is an identifiable adult, not a check of the biological or legal parental relationship. That is the standard the Rule sets, and designing a verification flow to a higher standard than the Rule requires, for example demanding proof of the parent-child relationship, imports an obligation the Rules do not impose while creating a new store of sensitive records.

3. How is parental status verified?

Rule 10(1) provides two pathways, and which applies depends on what the Data Fiduciary already holds (para 7.1).

Pathway one, Rule 10(1)(a): reliable details already held. This applies where the Data Fiduciary already holds reliable identity and age details of the individual claiming to be the parent. The most common scenario is one in which the parent is an existing registered user of the platform and has previously provided identity and age information as part of the registration process (para 7.1.1).

The operative word is “reliable”, and the book is specific about what it excludes. The standard is not mere existence of details but their reliability. The Data Fiduciary must assess whether the identity and age details it holds were originally obtained through a process providing a reasonable assurance of accuracy, for example through a Know Your Customer verification at the time of account opening, or through identity verification against a government-issued document. Details that were self-declared by the user without any form of verification at the time of provision would not constitute reliable details for the purposes of Rule 10(1)(a), because the Data Fiduciary has no independent basis for confirming their accuracy (para 7.1.1).

Pathway two, Rule 10(1)(b): voluntarily provided details or a virtual token. This applies where the parent is not an existing registered user and the Data Fiduciary does not hold reliable details. Verification is then conducted by reference to identity and age details voluntarily provided by the individual, or through a virtual token mapped to such details issued by an authorised entity (para 7.1.2).

Rule 10(2)(b) defines “authorised entity” as an entity entrusted by law, or by the Central Government or a State Government, with the issuance of details of identity and age or a virtual token mapped to such details, or a person appointed or permitted by such entity for such issuance. The definition also includes details of identity and age made available and verified by a Digital Locker Service Provider, as defined under the Information Technology Act, 2000 (para 7.1.2).

The book’s recommendation between the two is clear, and it is a data minimisation argument rather than a legal one. A process that requires parents to upload copies of government identity documents may satisfy the verification requirement, but it simultaneously creates a new repository of highly sensitive identity records that the organisation must secure, retain and eventually erase. A token-based approach achieves a more proportionate outcome: it allows the Data Fiduciary to establish that the individual providing consent is an identifiable adult without requiring the underlying identity document to enter the organisation’s systems (paras 7.1.2 and 7.1.2 continued).

The test it offers for evaluating verification providers is a single question: once verification is complete, what identity information remains within our environment? The preferable answer is as little as possible, and ideally none, beyond the evidence necessary to demonstrate that verification occurred (para 7.1.2).

In the Indian context, the book expects the virtual token model to evolve through government-backed digital identity infrastructure, particularly DigiLocker and similar trusted identity services, and recommends designing parental verification workflows with that architecture in mind from the outset (para 7.1.2).

Rule 10 is accompanied by four illustrations, which the book summarises as a useful map of the possible flows. Each involves a child, a parent and a Data Fiduciary. In Cases 1 and 2, the child initiates the interaction by informing the Data Fiduciary that she is a child and declaring the parent as her parent, and the Data Fiduciary enables the parent to identify herself. In Cases 3 and 4, the parent initiates the interaction by opening an account for the child. In each case, the Data Fiduciary must verify that the parent is an identifiable adult, either through reliable details already held, in Cases 1 and 3, or through details issued by an authorised entity or Digital Locker service, in Cases 2 and 4. The scenarios are illustrative, not exhaustive; the underlying principle is that the Data Fiduciary must confirm adult status through a verifiable mechanism before processing the child’s data (para 7.1.2).

4. What is prohibited outright, regardless of consent?

Two things, and neither can be unlocked by obtaining consent.

Section 9(2): processing detrimental to a child’s well-being. A Data Fiduciary shall not undertake such processing of personal data that is likely to cause any detrimental effect on the well-being of a child. The book notes that the provision is stated in absolute terms and does not admit exceptions. It applies regardless of whether verifiable parental consent has been obtained, regardless of whether the processing falls within an exemption under the Fourth Schedule, and regardless of the Data Fiduciary’s intent. The standard is objective: whether the processing is likely to cause a detrimental effect, not whether the Data Fiduciary intended to cause one or was aware of the risk (para 7.2).

The Act does not define “detrimental effect on the well-being of a child” or provide illustrations, which leaves the scope to be determined through Board proceedings, appellate jurisprudence and any guidance the Central Government or the Board may issue. At a minimum, the book expects the prohibition to encompass processing that exposes a child to age-inappropriate content, that facilitates contact between a child and unknown adults without safeguards, that uses a child’s personal data to generate psychological profiles for commercial exploitation, or that creates incentive structures such as algorithmic reward loops designed to maximise a child’s engagement with a digital service at the expense of their developmental well-being (para 7.2).

Its recommendation follows from the absence of a definition: organisations operating platforms or services accessible to children should conduct a child well-being impact assessment for each processing activity involving children’s personal data, documenting the assessment and the measures taken to ensure the processing does not cross the section 9(2) threshold (para 7.2).

Section 9(3): tracking, behavioural monitoring and targeted advertising. A Data Fiduciary shall not undertake tracking or behavioural monitoring of children or targeted advertising directed at children. The book is explicit that this is a categorical prohibition, not a consent-based restriction: even if a parent provides verifiable consent to the processing of a child’s personal data under section 9(1), the Data Fiduciary may not use that data for tracking, behavioural monitoring or targeted advertising (para 7.3).

The three prohibited activities are stated in the disjunctive, so each is independently prohibited, and the prohibition on targeted advertising applies to advertising “directed at” children, not merely advertising that happens to reach children among a broader audience (para 7.3).

The book then sets out what compliance requires in system terms, which is where this obligation differs from most others in the Act. Any platform accessible to children must implement technical controls that prevent tracking, behavioural monitoring and targeted advertising in respect of accounts or users identified as children. That requires, at a minimum, the ability to identify child accounts through age-gating mechanisms, the ability to segregate child accounts from the advertising and analytics infrastructure so that child data is not fed into behavioural profiling or ad-targeting algorithms, and the ability to serve only contextual or non-targeted advertising to child users (para 7.3).

On the scale of exposure, the book cites the Irish Data Protection Commission’s 2023 decision imposing a fine of EUR 345 million on TikTok for multiple GDPR violations relating to children’s data, including default public settings for child accounts, processing children’s data without an adequate lawful basis, and failure to provide transparent information in a child-friendly manner. Its reading of the decision is that it illustrates the expectation that platforms implement proactive, design-level protections for child users rather than relying on terms-of-service restrictions that children do not read and cannot meaningfully consent to (para 7.3).

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5. Which classes of Data Fiduciary are exempt?

Section 9(4) provides that sub-sections (1) and (3), that is verifiable parental consent and the prohibition on tracking and targeted advertising, shall not apply to processing of personal data of a child by such classes of Data Fiduciaries or for such purposes, and subject to such conditions, as may be prescribed. Rule 12 gives effect to this through the Fourth Schedule: Part A identifies classes of Data Fiduciaries that are exempt, and Part B identifies purposes for which exemptions apply. In each case the exemption is subject to conditions that limit the scope of the exempt processing (para 7.4). The wider set of exemptions under section 17, from legal claims to research and notified State bodies, is covered in the post on exemptions under the DPDP Act.

Part A identifies five classes (para 7.4.1):

Entry Class Condition
1 Clinical establishments, mental health establishments and healthcare professionals Processing restricted to provision of health services to the child and necessary for the protection of their health
2 Allied healthcare professionals Processing restricted to supporting implementation of a healthcare treatment and referral plan for the child, to the extent necessary for the protection of their health
3 Educational institutions Processing restricted to tracking and behavioural monitoring for the educational activities of the institution, or in the interests of safety of children enrolled with the institution
4 Individuals in whose care children in a creche or child day care centre are entrusted Processing restricted to tracking and behavioural monitoring in the interests of safety of the children
5 Data Fiduciaries engaged for transport of children enrolled with an educational institution, creche or child care centre Processing restricted to tracking the location of children in the interests of their safety during travel

The book stresses that the conditions attached to each exemption are narrow and purposive, and gives two worked limits.

A healthcare professional is exempt from verifiable parental consent and the tracking prohibition, but only to the extent that the processing is necessary for the protection of the child’s health. Processing of a child patient’s personal data for marketing of health services, or for building a behavioural profile of the child’s health-seeking patterns, would fall outside the exemption and would require verifiable parental consent and compliance with section 9(3) (para 7.4.1).

Similarly, an educational institution is exempt for tracking and monitoring related to educational activities and child safety, but not for tracking and monitoring undertaken for commercial analytics, advertising or purposes unrelated to education or safety (para 7.4.1).

The book also closes a misreading that otherwise arises: parental consent does not override the section 9(3) prohibition on tracking, behavioural monitoring and targeted advertising directed at children; that prohibition applies regardless of consent unless a Rule 12 or Fourth Schedule exemption specifically applies (para 7.4.1).

6. Which purposes are exempt?

Part B of the Fourth Schedule identifies six purposes for which the verifiable consent and tracking prohibitions do not apply (para 7.4.2):

Entry Purpose
1 Exercise of any power, performance of any function, or discharge of any duty in the interests of a child under any law for the time being in force
2 Provision of subsidies, benefits, services, certificates, licences or permits in the interests of a child under section 7(b)
3 Creation of a user account for communicating by email, restricted to the extent necessary for creating such account and limited to email communication
4 Determination of the real-time location of a child, restricted to tracking in the interest of their safety, protection or security
5 Ensuring that information, services or advertisements likely to cause detrimental effect on a child’s well-being are not accessible to them
6 Confirmation that the Data Principal is not a child, and for observance of due diligence under Rule 10

Three of these repay closer reading.

Entry 3 is deliberately narrow. The book describes it as a targeted exception that recognises the ubiquity of email as a communication tool while limiting the exemption to the narrowest possible scope: the account may be created and used only for email communication, and the processing is restricted to what is necessary for account creation (para 7.4.2).

Entries 5 and 6 create what the book calls a purposeful circularity, and understanding it resolves a problem that otherwise looks like a deadlock. To prevent a child from accessing content likely to cause a detrimental effect on her well-being, which is the section 9(2) obligation, the Data Fiduciary may need to process the child’s personal data to identify her as a child and to filter content accordingly, and that processing is exempted from the verifiable consent requirement that would otherwise apply. Entry 6 similarly exempts the age-verification process itself: confirming that a Data Principal is not a child, which is a prerequisite to applying the general consent framework rather than the children’s framework, necessarily involves processing the individual’s personal data, and that processing is exempt from the children’s consent requirements (para 7.4.2).

Without those two entries, every age gate would require parental consent to operate, and no age gate could operate before it had been operated.

One point on the limits of age-gating also belongs here. The book notes that the Act obliges the Data Fiduciary to implement reasonable age-gating and verification, but does not guarantee against circumvention, and liability turns on whether the Data Fiduciary’s own measures were reasonable, not on the circumvention itself (para 7.4.2).

An organisation claiming any exemption under Part A or Part B must document the basis for the claim, including the specific entry relied upon, the conditions attached to that entry, and the evidence that the conditions are satisfied. The exemption register should be maintained alongside the lawful basis register and reviewed at the same intervals, because an exemption validly claimed when processing was initiated may cease to be valid if the scope of processing changes or the conditions are no longer met. The register should record the date of the initial assessment, the identity of the assessor, the conditions verified, and the date and outcome of each periodic review (para 7.7.4).

7. Can a Data Fiduciary obtain a lower age threshold?

In principle yes, and in practice not yet.

Section 9(5) provides that the Central Government may, if satisfied that a Data Fiduciary has ensured that its processing of personal data of children is done in a manner that is verifiably safe, notify an age above which that Data Fiduciary shall be exempt from the obligations under sub-sections (1) and (3) in respect of processing by it. The book reads the provision as contemplating a certification or recognition process through which a Data Fiduciary that demonstrates a sufficiently high standard of child safety in its processing practices may be permitted to apply a lower age threshold (para 7.5).

As of the date of the Timelines Notification G.S.R. 843(E), the Central Government has not issued any notification under section 9(5), and no Data Fiduciary has been granted an age-threshold exemption. Until such notifications are issued, the default age of eighteen years under section 2(f) applies universally, and all Data Fiduciaries must comply with sections 9(1) and 9(3) in respect of all individuals below that age (para 7.5).

For an organisation that may eventually apply, the book’s advice is to start building the record now: documented child safety policies, technical safeguards against detrimental processing, effective age-gating mechanisms, parental control tools, and audit reports that demonstrate the consistent application of these measures over time (para 7.5). A “verifiably safe” standard is, on its face, an evidentiary standard, and evidence of consistent application cannot be generated retrospectively.

8. How does this work for persons with disability?

Section 9(1) covers a person with disability who has a lawful guardian, and Rule 11 sets the verification requirements, which are more demanding than those for parents.

Rule 11(1) specifies that the Data Fiduciary, while obtaining such consent, shall observe due diligence to verify that the guardian is appointed by a court of law, by a designated authority, or by a local level committee under the law applicable to guardianship (para 7.6).

Rule 11(2) defines the relevant terms (paras 7.6 and 7.6 continued):

Term Definition
Designated authority An authority designated under section 15 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 to support persons with disabilities in exercise of their legal capacity
Law applicable to guardianship, first category For individuals with long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment who, despite adequate and appropriate support, are unable to take legally binding decisions: the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 and the rules made thereunder
Law applicable to guardianship, second category For persons suffering from conditions relating to autism, cerebral palsy, mental retardation, or Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s Disease in senior citizens, or a combination of such conditions: the National Trust for the Welfare of Persons with Autism, Cerebral Palsy, Mental Retardation and Multiple Disabilities Act, 1999 and the rules made thereunder
Local level committee A committee constituted under section 13 of the National Trust Act, 1999

The book makes two clarifications that matter for how the flow is built.

Rule 11 applies to any Data Principal with a lawful guardian appointed under the applicable guardianship law, regardless of the specific diagnosis (para 7.6). And the definition of Data Principal under section 2(j) includes the lawful guardian of a person with disability only where the guardian is lawfully appointed under the applicable guardianship laws, and not by reason of disability status alone. Anyone retaining full legal capacity consents as any other Data Principal does (para 2.5).

The verification obligation under Rule 11 is more demanding than the parental verification under Rule 10, because it requires the Data Fiduciary to verify a legal appointment rather than merely adult status. The guardian must have been appointed by a court, a designated authority or a local level committee, and not merely declared by the individual as a guardian, so the Data Fiduciary must request and review evidence of the appointment: a court order, a certificate from a designated authority, or a record from a local level committee. The book acknowledges that this creates an operational burden, particularly for digital-first services where the entire user journey is conducted online, but notes that it reflects the legal reality that guardianship of persons with disability is a court-supervised or authority-supervised relationship, not a self-declared one (para 7.6).

Its worked example: where a court has appointed a guardian for a senior citizen who is unable to take legally binding decisions, the guardian may present the guardianship order and proof of identity to the Data Fiduciary, which should verify both the individual’s identity and the guardian’s legal authority before relying on the guardian’s consent. A family relationship or informal caregiving arrangement alone is not a substitute for lawful guardianship (para 7.6).

The procedure should be documented as a standard operating procedure specifying the documents accepted as evidence of appointment, the verification steps performed by staff or automated systems, the retention of verification records, and the process for handling cases where the evidence is unclear, disputed or unavailable. Staff responsible for processing personal data of persons with disability should receive training on the applicable guardianship legislation, the categories of disability covered by each statute, and the types of documentary evidence that constitute valid proof of appointment. The procedure should be designed to be respectful of the dignity of the person with disability and their guardian, while ensuring that the Data Fiduciary can demonstrate, if required, that it observed the due diligence standard prescribed by Rule 11(1) (para 7.7.5).

9. How should age-gating and verification be designed?

The implementation of section 9(1) and Rule 10 requires the Data Fiduciary to address two sequential questions in its user interface and backend systems: is the Data Principal a child, and if so, has verifiable parental consent been obtained? The first requires an age-gating mechanism, a process through which the Data Fiduciary determines, at or before the point of account creation or data collection, whether the individual is below eighteen years of age. The second requires a parental verification mechanism, through which the Data Fiduciary confirms that the individual providing consent is an adult who is identifiable and who claims parental or guardian status (para 7.7.1).

On the age gate, the book sets a floor that disposes of the most common design. A simple date-of-birth field that a child can bypass by entering a false date does not constitute an appropriate technical measure under Rule 10(1). The mechanism should incorporate at least one verification element that goes beyond self-declaration, for example correlation with identity details previously provided by the user, or age estimation based on identity documents submitted during account creation. The choice of mechanism will depend on the Data Fiduciary’s risk profile, the nature of its services, the sensitivity of the personal data it collects, and the availability of integration with authorised entities or Digital Locker service providers for token-based verification (para 7.7.1).

On the section 9(3) prohibitions, the design requirement is enforcement at system level. Once an account or user session is identified as belonging to a child, the systems that perform tracking, whether cookie-based or device-based cross-site tracking or location tracking beyond real-time safety purposes, behavioural monitoring, meaning the collection and analysis of usage patterns, click-stream data and content engagement metrics for profiling purposes, and targeted advertising, meaning advertisements selected on the basis of behavioural profiles, interest categories or personal data attributes, must be configured to exclude that account or session from their scope (para 7.7.3).

The configuration evidence, that is the rules, filters or flags applied within the advertising platform, the analytics system and the tracking infrastructure to exclude child accounts, should be documented and subject to periodic audit. The book names the gap it most often observes: the assumption that compliance with section 9(3) can be achieved by instructing the advertising team not to target children, without implementing the technical controls that enforce the instruction at the system level. In the absence of system-level enforcement, the prohibition depends on human compliance with a policy directive, a dependency that is inherently fragile and difficult to demonstrate to an auditor or to the Board (para 7.7.3).

Where the age gate, the verification integration and the exclusion rules in the advertising and analytics stack have to be designed, documented and tested rather than asserted, including compliance SOPs and automation of compliances, Taxmann Advisory provides implementation support.

10. What record should each verification leave?

Figure 7.1 in the book sets out a Parental Consent Verification Record with four blocks (para 7.7.2):

Block Fields
Child and parent identification Child Data Principal name or user ID; date of birth declared; age at processing; parent or guardian name; relationship declared, as parent or lawful guardian
Verification method on file [Rule 10(1)] One of three, each with its detail, a “verified as identifiable adult” flag and a date verified: existing identity details held by the Data Fiduciary under Rule 10(1)(a), with the source recorded as a KYC record, prior registration or other; voluntarily provided identity and age details under Rule 10(1)(b)(i), with the document type recorded; or a virtual token from an authorised entity under Rule 10(1)(b)(ii), with the issuing entity and token reference recorded
Consent Consent obtained, with date and method, for example a button click or checkbox; consent scope, describing the processing purpose
Section 9(3) controls applied Three confirmations: tracking excluded for this account; behavioural monitoring excluded for this account; targeted advertising excluded for this account

The record closes with the name of the staff member or system that verified, and the date (para 7.7.2).

The last block is the one that makes the record worth keeping. Recording, per account, that the three section 9(3) exclusions were applied converts a system configuration into a per-child evidentiary trail, which is precisely what the auditor and the Board will ask for.

11. What does an auditor test, and what goes wrong?

The test programme for this obligation area (para 7.8): whether an age-gating mechanism exists and operates beyond mere self-declaration; whether parental consent verification records are maintained for every child account with the verification method documented per Rule 10(1); whether system-level technical controls enforce the section 9(3) prohibitions, so that tracking, behavioural monitoring and targeted advertising are excluded for child accounts and not merely the subject of a policy directive; whether Fourth Schedule exemptions claimed by the organisation are documented with the specific entry relied upon, the conditions verified and the date of assessment; and whether the section 9(2) prohibition on detrimental processing has been assessed for each processing activity involving children’s data.

The evidence to have ready: age-gating mechanism documentation covering the design specification and verification logic; sample parental consent verification records; advertising platform configuration showing child-account exclusion rules; analytics platform configuration showing child-account exclusion from behavioural profiling; the Fourth Schedule exemption register; child well-being impact assessment documentation; and guardian verification records for persons with disability under Rule 11 (para 7.8).

The four findings the book reports as recurring (para 7.8):

Finding What it looks like
Age-gating by self-declaration alone A date-of-birth field a child can bypass by entering a false date
Section 9(3) as a policy directive An instruction to the advertising team with no system-level enforcement
Exemptions claimed without conditions documented A Fourth Schedule entry relied on without recording the specific conditions satisfied
No guardian verification procedure Self-declaration accepted for persons with disability, without verifying legal appointment

The book’s sector findings add a fifth that belongs with these: healthcare providers claiming Fourth Schedule exemptions without documenting the specific conditions (para 13.10). The exemption in Part A, entry 1 is available only where processing is restricted to the provision of health services to the child and is necessary for the protection of their health, and a claim recorded without that restriction evidenced is a claim an auditor cannot verify.

Appendix A records the evidence framing for the primary obligation: age-gating mechanism documentation including interface screenshots and technical design; parental identity and age verification process documentation and standard operating procedure; verifiable consent records for each child Data Principal linked to the verified parent; integration documentation with the authorised entity or Digital Locker service provider for virtual token verification; a due diligence checklist for parent verification with completion records; and a procedure for handling cases where parent verification fails (Appendix A, section 3).

That last item is the one most often missing from an otherwise complete design. A verification flow needs a defined path for the case where verification does not succeed, because the alternative, processing the child’s data anyway, is the breach the whole mechanism exists to prevent.

12. Quick answers

Who is a child under the DPDP Act?

Section 2(f) defines a child as an individual who has not completed the age of eighteen years. Section 2(j) extends the definition of Data Principal so that, where the individual is a child, it includes the parents or lawful guardian, and where the individual is a person with disability, it includes her lawful guardian acting on her behalf.

What is verifiable parental consent under the DPDP Act?

Section 9(1) requires the Data Fiduciary, before processing any personal data of a child, to obtain verifiable consent of the parent. Rule 10(1) requires appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure that such consent is obtained, and due diligence to check that the individual identifying herself as the parent is an adult who is identifiable if required in connection with compliance with any law in force in India. Verification may be by reference to reliable identity and age details already held by the Data Fiduciary under Rule 10(1)(a), or to details voluntarily provided or a virtual token issued by an authorised entity under Rule 10(1)(b).

Can a company advertise to children with parental consent?

No. Section 9(3) prohibits tracking or behavioural monitoring of children and targeted advertising directed at children, and the prohibition is categorical rather than consent-based. Even where a parent provides verifiable consent to processing under section 9(1), the Data Fiduciary may not use the data for those purposes, unless a specific exemption under Rule 12 and the Fourth Schedule applies.

What are the exemptions for children’s data under the DPDP Rules?

Rule 12 and the Fourth Schedule set out two categories. Part A exempts five classes of Data Fiduciary, each on conditions: clinical and mental health establishments and healthcare professionals; allied healthcare professionals; educational institutions; individuals caring for children in a creche or day care centre; and Data Fiduciaries engaged for the transport of enrolled children. Part B exempts six purposes, including the exercise of functions in the interests of a child under law, provision of subsidies and benefits under section 7(b), creation of an email account limited to email communication, determination of a child’s real-time location for safety, preventing access to content likely to cause detrimental effect, and confirming that a Data Principal is not a child.

Does the DPDP Act allow a lower age threshold?

Section 9(5) permits the Central Government, if satisfied that a Data Fiduciary has ensured its processing of children’s personal data is verifiably safe, to notify an age above which that Data Fiduciary is exempt from sections 9(1) and 9(3). As of the Timelines Notification G.S.R. 843(E), dated 13 November 2025, no notification has been issued and no Data Fiduciary has been granted an age-threshold exemption, so the default age of eighteen applies universally.

How is a guardian verified for a person with disability?

Rule 11(1) requires the Data Fiduciary to observe due diligence to verify that the guardian is appointed by a court of law, by a designated authority under section 15 of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, or by a local level committee constituted under section 13 of the National Trust Act, 1999. The Data Fiduciary must request and review evidence of the appointment, such as a court order, a certificate from a designated authority or a record from a local level committee. A family relationship or informal caregiving arrangement is not a substitute for lawful guardianship.

Is a date-of-birth field enough for age-gating?

No. Taxmann’s Digital Personal Data Protection states that a simple date-of-birth field a child can bypass by entering a false date does not constitute an appropriate technical measure under Rule 10(1). The mechanism should incorporate at least one verification element beyond self-declaration, such as correlation with identity details previously provided by the user, or age estimation based on identity documents submitted during account creation.

What is the penalty for breaching the children’s data obligations?

Up to Rs. 200 crore under the Schedule to the Act for breach of the additional obligations in relation to children under section 9. Section 33(1) engages the penalty power only where the Board determines the breach to be significant, and section 33(2) requires the amount to be calibrated against seven factors, including the type and nature of the personal data affected and the timeliness and effectiveness of any mitigation action taken.


This article draws on Chapter 7 of Taxmann’s Digital Personal Data Protection – An Essential Guide to India’s DPDP Law by CA Narasimhan Elangovan (2026 Edition), which examines verifiable parental consent under section 9(1) and the two verification pathways in Rule 10, the prohibitions under sections 9(2) and 9(3), the Fourth Schedule exemptions in Rule 12, the age-threshold mechanism under section 9(5), guardian verification for persons with disability under Rule 11, the age-gating and technical control design, the Parental Consent Verification Record in Figure 7.1, and the audit considerations for this chapter. It also draws on Chapter 2 on the definition of Data Principal, Chapter 13 on sector findings, Chapter 14 on the penalty framework, and Appendix A on the evidence each verification should leave behind. Law stated as updated till 15 September 2026.

The DPDP Act, 2023, the DPDP Rules, 2025 and the notifications of 13 November 2025 are available on Taxmann.com | Research under Indian Acts and Rules.

Related reading: lawful processing and consent under the DPDP Act · scope and key definitions · DPDP in the healthcare ecosystem · obligations of Data Fiduciaries.

More in this series: the Data Protection Board of India · how a DPDP compliance audit is conducted · Significant Data Fiduciary obligations · Consent Managers under the DPDP framework · personal data breach intimation under Rule 7 · handling Data Principal rights requests · Data Fiduciary, Data Processor or both · the SPDI Rules and the DPDP Act · the Record of Processing Activities (ROPA) · the incident response plan · data retention and erasure · the privacy notice under Rule 3 · the data processing agreement · data localisation and cross-border transfers · employee data and workplace monitoring · exemptions under the DPDP Act · legitimate uses under section 7.

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