Anti-competitive Agreements Under the Competition Act

Anti-competitive agreements are arrangements or understandings between enterprises, persons, or associations that adversely affect or are likely to adversely affect competition in the market. These agreements may distort market dynamics by restricting fair competition through practices such as price-fixing, market sharing, limiting production or supply, bid rigging, or collusive behavior.

Table of Contents

1. Anti-Competitive Agreements Void
2. What is ‘Void Agreement’
3. Presumed Anti-Competitive Agreements
4. Agreement Which Directly or Indirectly Determines Purchase or Sale Prices
5. Agreement Which Limits or Controls Production, Supply, Markets, Technical Development, Investment or Provision of Services
6. Agreement Which Shares the Market or Source of Production or Provision of Services

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1. Anti-Competitive Agreements Void

Section 3 of Competition Act provides for prohibition of Anti-Competitive Agreements.

No enterprise or association of enterprises or person or association of persons shall enter into any agreement in respect of production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services, which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within India. [Section 3(1) of Competition Act].

Any agreement entered into in contravention of the provisions contained in section 3(1) shall be void. [Section 3(2) of Competition Act].

1.1 Two Categories of Anti-Competitive Agreements

Anti-competitive agreements are specified in the Competition Act in two categories:

1. Presumed anti-competitive agreements – Here burden is on the party (defendant) to prove that the practice is not anti-competitive [section 3(3) of Competition Act].
2. Anti competitive if agreement affects competition – Here the burden is on appellant (who is alleging anti-competitive practice) to prove that the practice is anti-competitive [section 3(4) of Competition Act].

Agreements prior to the implementation of the Act are not void – The Competition Act does not act retrospectively i.e. agreement entered prior to
20-5-2009 is not void. However, the Act would cover even earlier agreements and enquiry can be conducted – Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. v. CCI (2011) 108 SCL 621 = 12 taxmann.com 285 (Bom HC DB).

Exemption to vessel sharing agreements for three years upto 4-7-2021 – Vessels sharing agreements of Liner Shipping Industry has been exempted from provisions of section 3 of Competition Act for three years (upto 4-7-2021) in respect of all carriers of all nationalities operating from ship of any nationality. Such arrangement should not include fixing of prices, limitation of sales or allocation of market. The Director General of Shipping shall monitor the agreement – Notification No. SO 3250(E), dated 4-7-2018 [earlier No. SO 1933(E) dated 16-6-2017 which was valid for the period
16-6-2017 to 16-6-2018].

It seems the exemption has not been extended.

1.2 Entering into Specified Agreement Itself is Not Offence

Entering into specified agreement by itself is not offence under the Competition Act.

Agreement specified in section 3(3) of Competition Act is presumed to be anti-competitive and burden is on the enterprise to establish that these are not anti-competitive.

In case of agreements specified in section 3(4) of Competition Act, the burden is on informant to establish that these are anti-competitive.

Act is not a penal Act, as agreement specified in section 3 by itself is not offence – Competition Act is not a penal Act as it does not make punishable by itself an act of entering into an agreement, contrary to provisions of Act. Breach of sections 3 and 4 of Competition Act by itself is not an offence and, therefore, entering into an agreement, contrary to provisions of law, is not an offence but such agreement is only void that may not be enforceable in law. Even if parties enter into an agreement covered by Act that by itself, does not amount to an offence. What is made punishable is disobedience of order passed by Commission and its non-compliance – Kingfisher Airlines Ltd. v. CCI (2011) 108 SCL 621 = 12 taxmann.com 285 (Bom HC DB).

2. What is ‘Void Agreement’

Provisions relating to void agreement have been specified in Contract Act.

An agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void. [Section 2(g) of Contract Act].

Note that it is not ‘void contract’, as an agreement which is not enforceable by law does not become ‘contract’ at all.

Void agreement need not be illegal – Void means null and ineffective and without any legal force or binding effect. It need not be illegal. It will be illegal if specifically declared so.

A void agreement or voidable contract (which is not illegal) is not punishable under Criminal Law.

Compensation under Void Agreement – A void agreement cannot be enforced in Court of Law, but compensation/damages can be claimed and return of benefits obtained under void agreement can be claimed.

2.1 Void Agreements Under Contract Act

Following are void agreements under Contract Act:

• Agreement with person incompetent to contract (like minor, person of unsound mind, undischarged insolvent, alien enemy, convict) (section 11 of Contract Act).
• Both parties under mistake of fact (section 20 of Contract Act).
• Unlawful object or consideration (sections 23 and 24 of Contract Act).
• Agreement without consideration (section 25 of Contract Act).
• Agreement in restraint of marriage (section 26 of Contract Act).
• Agreement in restraint of trade (section 27 of Contract Act).
• Agreement in restraint of legal proceedings (section 28 of Contract Act).
• Uncertain agreement (section 29 of Contract Act).
• Wagering agreement (section 30 of Contract Act).
• Agreement to do an impossible Act (first sentence of section 56 of Contract Act).

Provisions of Agreement in restraint of trade in Contract Act – Provisions in respect of agreement in restraint of trade as contained in section 27 of Contract Act are applicable mutatis mutandis in Competition Act also.

3. Presumed Anti-Competitive Agreements

As per section 3(3) of Competition Act, any agreement entered into between enterprises or associations of enterprises or persons or associations of persons or between any person and enterprise or practice carried on, or decision taken by, any association of enterprises or association of persons, including cartels, engaged in identical or similar trade of goods or provision of services, shall be presumed to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition, which:

• directly or indirectly determines purchase or sale prices.
• limits or controls production, supply, markets, technical development, investment or provision of services.
• shares the market or source of production or provision of services by way of allocation of geographical area of market, or type of goods or services, or number of customers in the market or any other similar way.
• directly or indirectly results in bid rigging or collusive bidding.

Provision does not apply to joint ventures if it improves efficiency – Nothing contained in section 3(3) of Competition Act shall apply to any agreement entered into by way of joint ventures if such agreement increases efficiency in production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services – First proviso to section 3(3) of Competition Act.

Enterprise or persons not engaged in similar trade may get covered – An enterprise or association of enterprises or a person or association of persons though not engaged in identical or similar trade shall also be presumed to be part of the agreement under section if it participates or intends to participate in the furtherance of such agreement – Second proviso to section 3(3) of Competition Act, inserted vide Competition (Amendment) Act, 2023 from 18-5-2023.

3.1 Shall Be Presumed

The words used in the section are ‘shall be presumed’. As per section 4 of Evidence Act, wherever it is directed that the Court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved. Thus, the presumption is rebuttable, i.e. the defendant can prove that it has no appreciable adverse effect on competition.

The CCI and Tribunal shall presume that the practices enumerated in section 3(3) of Competition Act are anti-competitive. However, defendant can prove that these are not anti-competitive.

Meaning of ‘shall presume’ – The term ‘shall presume’ used in an Act means it is a ‘rebuttable presumption’ Proof to the contrary can be submitted – State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bharat Heavy Electricals – 1998 (99) ELT 33 (SC) * Sodhi Transport v. State of UP (1986) 62 STC 381 = AIR 1986 SC 1099 = (1986) 2 SCC 486 * M S Madhusoodhanan v. Kerala Kaumudi 2003 AIR SCW 7165 = 46 SCL 695 (SC).

Presumption is an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of the truth or falsehood of a doubtful fact or proposition drawn by process of probable reasoning from something proved or taken for granted – Izhar Ahmad v. UOI AIR 1962 SC 1052 – quoted with approval in M S Madhusoodhanan v. Kerala Kaumudi 2003 AIR SCW 7165 = 46 SCL 695 (SC).

Further evidence not required – In Vedant Bio Sciences v. Chemists and Druggists Association of Baroda (2012) 115 SCL 757 = 25 taxmann.com 184 (CCI), it was held that once existence of prohibited agreement, practice or decision enumerated in section 3(3) of Competition Act is established, there is no further need to show an effect on competition in view of the rebuttable presumption in section 3(3) of Competition Act.

Presumption is rebuttable by evidence – The term ‘shall presume’ used in an Act means it is a ‘rebuttable presumption’ Proof to the contrary can be submitted – State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bharat Heavy Electricals – 1998(99) ELT 33 (SC) * Sodhi Transport v. State of UP (1986) 62 STC 381 = AIR 1986 SC 1099 = (1986) 2 SCC 486 * M S Madhusoodhanan v. Kerala Kaumudi 2003 AIR SCW 7165 = 46 SCL 695 (SC).

Practices are ‘Presumed’ not ‘deemed’– The practices (a) to (d) are ‘presumed anti-competitive practices’. They are not ‘deemed’ anti-competitive practices.

Distinction between ‘presumed’ and ‘deemed’ is that in case of a ‘deeming provision’, Court has to assume that the ‘deemed position’ is ‘real position’ and apply law accordingly. Defendant cannot prove that they are not really anti-competitive practices. In case of ‘presumed practice’, defendant can prove that they are not anti-competitive practices, but only burden of proof is on him.

3.2 Agreements Presumed to be Anti-Competitive Unless Proved Otherwise

Agreements which are presumed to be anti-competitive unless proved otherwise, as specified in section 3(3) of Competition Act are discussed below one by one.

4. Agreement Which Directly or Indirectly Determines Purchase or Sale Prices

Agreement which directly or indirectly determines purchase or sale prices, is presumed to be anti-competitive – Section 3(3)(a) of Competition Act.

Directly or indirectly determining purchase or sale price’ may include ‘Resale Price Maintenance’ – In my opinion ‘directly or indirectly determining purchase or sale price’ will include ‘Resale Price Maintenance’ also and hence it will be a ‘presumed anti-competitive price’, though ‘resale price maintenance’ is covered under section 3(4) of Competition Act.

Uber and Ola do not enter into price fixation agreements with drivers – In Samir Agrawal v. Competition Commission of India (2021) 3 SCC 136 = 164 SCL 344 = 122 taxmann.com 150 (SC 3 member bench), it has been held that Ola and Uber (radio taxi service providers) have not entered into price fixing agreement with drivers, as drivers were independent and acted independently of each other [affirming Samir Agrawal v. Competition Commission of India (2020) 122 taxmann.com 149 (NCLAT)].

5. Agreement Which Limits or Controls Production, Supply, Markets, Technical Development, Investment or Provision of Services

Agreement which limits or controls production, supply, markets, technical development, investment or provision of services, is presumed to be anti-competitive – Section 3(3)(b) of Competition Act.

Wording of section 33(1)(g) of MRTP Act was similar.

Restrictions on production, distribution or exhibition of films by non-members – In Reliance Big Entertainment Ltd. v. Karnataka Film Chamber of Commerce (2012) 112 SCL 159 = 18 taxmann.com 301 (CCI), the association was indulging in following:

• placing restrictions not to deal with non-members
• imposing restrictions on number of screens for non-regional films
• enforcing restrictions by banning films, collective boycott, withholding share etc.

It was held that this resulted in limit on supply and distribution of films in market. It created barriers to entry into market by non-members. Penalty was imposed on the association and they were asked to desist from such practices. The order has been upheld in Motion Pictures Association v. Reliance Big Entertainment P. Ltd. (2014) 123 SCL 55 = 35 taxmann.com 237 (CAT).

In Reliance Big Entertainment Ltd. v. Tamil Film Exhibitors Association (2014) 123 SCL 294 = 40 taxmann.com 476 (CCI), the association had issued instructions to its members to ban one film. It was held that this act is anti-competitive.

In Sajjan Khaitan  v. Eastern India Motion Picture Association (EIMPA) (2012) 115 SCL 383 = 25 taxmann.com 275 (CCI), EIMPA and Coordination Committee of various associations of Cine Artists, workers and Technicians raised objections about telecast of dubbed version of Hindi serial (Mahabharat) in Bengali and issued instructions to stop its telecast to the TV channel. It was held that this is an anti-competitive practice. Cease and desist orders were issued – The view has been confirmed in CCI v. Coordination Committee of Artists (2017) 5 SCC 17 = 140 SCL 655 = 79 taxmann.com 136 (SC).

In Mrs. Manju Tharad v. Eastern India Motion Picture Association (EIMPA) (2012) 114 SCL 20 = 22 taxmann.com 87 (CCI), the practice of EIMPA restricting its members not to deal with non-members, making compulsory registration of each film before release in their territory were held as anti-competitive.

Restrictions by Associations – In Vedant Bio Sciences v. Chemists and Druggists Association of Baroda (2012) 115 SCL 757 = 25 taxmann.com 184 (CCI), the Association had formulated guidelines which required for procurement of NOC from association by the pharmaceutical company for several aspects like launch of new company products, appointment of new stockist, addition of stockist etc. If NOC was not obtained, pharmaceutical company could not supply and sell drugs in market. It was held that the conduct and practices of Association are anti-competitive – Similar order in Varca Druggists and Chemist v. Chemists and Druggists Association, Goa (2012) 114 SCL 86 (Mag) = 23 taxmann.com 136 (CCI) * Santuka Associates P. Ltd. v. All India Organisation of Chemists and Drugists (2013) 120 SCL 172 = 35 taxmann.com 393 (CCI) * Peeveear Medical Agencies, Kerala v. All India Organisation of Chemists and Drugists (2014) 126 SCL 303 = 42 taxmann.com 394 (CCI) * Chemists and Druggists Association, Goa, In re (2015) 130 SCL 677 = 52 taxmann.com 124 (CCI) * PK Krishnan v. Paul Madavana (2016) 65 taxmann.com 250 (CCI).

Insisting on NOC from Association – Requirement that ‘No Objection’ should be obtained from Association before marketing new products or discontinuing or adding new stockiest is anti-competitive – DGIR v. All India Organisation of Chemists & Druggists (1996) 87 Comp Cas 544 (MRTPC). Same view in DGIR v. Bengal Chemist & Druggist Assn. (1997) 27 CLA 182 (MRTPC).

Truck Owners association not allowing trucks from non-members – Truck Owners Association preventing complainant from hiring trucks of operators who are not members of their Union is anti-competitive – Mewar Chamber of Commerce & Industry v. Bhilwara Dist. Truck Operators Assn. (1995) 3 CTJ 7 (MRTPC) *Jay Shree Tea & Industries Ltd. v. Janta Truck Union (1997) 5 CTJ 285 (MRTPC).

Restrictions on distributor in selling goods – Condition in agreement with distributor that distributor will not make supplies to chemists, doctors and Government or private institution even though distributor must accept the order. Seller will sell directly to these customers without any commission to the distributor. This blocked a major segment for the supply of these products – DGIR v. Bayer (India) Ltd. – RTPE 121 of 1988 decided on 29-7-1994 – (1995) 81 Taxman 178 (Mag) (MRTPC).

Restrictions on selling goods outside specified area – Condition in an agreement prohibiting sale outside allotted area is restrictive trade practice – Maegaware Computers Ltd., In re (1994) 79 Comp. Cas. 84.

Appointing stockists confined to operations only in one district and only one stockist to be appointed for one district is restrictive trade practice – DGIR v. All India Organisation of Chemists – (1992) 73 Comp. Cas. 668 (MRTPC).

Territory restrictions on distributors can be permitted to ensure that distributor has requisite infrastructure, so that he can provide proper services and facilities. Jai Shree Fibre Products Ltd. – RTPE No. 1274/87 – quoted and followed in DGIR v. Rallis India Ltd. (1995) 3 CTJ 151 (MRTPC).

An agreement containing the clause that the dealer will concentrate on a particular area is permissible if there is no prohibition on him from effecting sales in other areas – DGIR v. Rajshree Cement (1995) 83 Comp. Cas. 712 (MRTPC).

In some agreements of conditions of area restrictions, MRTP Commission ordered to change the clause in terms like:

• The dealer will primarily promote sales in the area specified or
• Dealer will concentrate his efforts within the area of district to the best of his ability.

Restriction on dealing in similar goods after end of franchisee agreement – In Imperial Radio & Gramophone Co. v. Pieco Electronics (1996) 20 CLA 61. In DGIR v. Titan Industries (2001) 43 CLA 293 (MRTPC), there was a clause in agreement with franchisee that the franchisee will not deal in products or goods of similar nature for a period of 3 years from date of determination of agreement within radius of 5 Kms from showroom. It was held that it is Restrictive Trade Practice (RTP).

Restrictions on agent permissible, if agreement not on principal to principal basis– It has been held that restrictions as to territory and restriction as to dealing in similar goods can be imposed on agent, if the agreement with him is not on ‘principal to principal’ basis. In agency agreement, such restriction is permissible to avoid unhealthy competition between agents. (MRTPC in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. decided on 17-5-1978, confirmed and followed in DGIR v. Modi Industries Ltd. decided on 30-10-1991 CS May 92 p. 433) also followed in DG v. Bharat Commerce and Industries Ltd. decided by MRTPC on 9-5-91 – CS Oct. 91 p. 854. Same view in Piramal Health Care Ltd. In re (2000) 37 CLA 353 (MRTPC) * DGIR v. Bombay Paints (1991) 71 Comp. Cas. 428 (MRTPC).

5.1 Cartel is Presumed Anti-competitive Agreement

“Cartel” includes an association of producers, sellers, distributors, traders or service providers who, by agreement amongst themselves, limit, control or attempt to control the production, distribution, sale or price of, or, trade in goods or provision of services. [Section 2(c) of Competition Act].

The provisions are similar to section 33(1)(d) of MRTP Act.

Cartel is also called as ‘knock out agreement’.

Cartel is a ‘presumed’ anti-competitive agreement.

Some examples of cartel (as decided under MRTP Act) are as follows:

• All tyre manufacturers increasing price uniformly and simultaneously by mutual agreement.
• Association of transporters fixing uniform price below which no member should quote.
• Various manufacturers quoting identical prices – It evidences cartel though direct proof in such matters cannot be made available.

In UOI v. Hindustan Development Corporation (1993) 3 SCC 499 = (1994) 2 CTJ 270 (SC), it was observed – ‘Cartel is an association of producers who by agreement among themselves attempt to control production, sale and prices of the product to obtain a monopoly in any particular industry or commodity. It amounts to unfair trade practice which is not in public interest’.

Though the words used were ‘association of producers’, in Alkali Manufacturers Association v. Sinochem International Chemical Co. Ltd. (1999) 33 CLA 27 (MRTPC), it was (rightly) held that a cartel can be of various enterprises and companies not necessarily being the producer of goods. ‘Cartels’ would entail all sorts of combinations whether by producers or otherwise. In this case, it was held that once prima facie evidence of cartel is established, injunction can be granted.

Trade Associations asking members not to sale below price fixed by association – Trade Association asking their members not to sell below the rates announced by it, with a threat of expulsion in the event of non-compliance is anti-competitive – Madras Jewellers and Diamond Merchants’ Association (1994) 2 CTJ 198 (MRTPC).

In Retail Grain Dealers Association v. Bombay Kirana Colour & Chemical merchants Association (1996) 21 CLA 383 (MRTPC), circular of association directing its members to collect additional charges for service and packing and charge interest at specified rates for delayed payment was held to be an restrictive trade practice.

Cartel by bearing manufacturers – In ABC Bearings Ltd. In re (2020) 117 taxmann.com 89 = 161 SCL 383 (CCI), it was observed that key competitors in market discussed with each other to decide prices to be quoted to OEM. It was held that cartel is established.

In DGIR v. Modi Alkali (2002) 51 CLA 93 (MRTPC), it was observed the three essential ingredients of cartel are:

1. Parity of prices
2. Agreement by way of concerted action suggesting conspiracy and
3. To gain monopoly or restrict or eliminate competition.

In Sumitomo Corporation In re (2001) 42 CLA 12 (MRTPC), it was held that carteisation imposes unjustified cost on consumers. Price fixing is illegal per se, therefore, further enquiry on the issue of intent or the anti-competition effect is not required.

In some cases, charge of collective action was not held to be proved:

(a) Some small battery manufacturers quoting same price as that of major manufacturer as the major manufacturer was ‘price-leader’. (Generally, small manufacturers follow the prices announced by large manufacturer without any collective agreement. In such cases, the large manufacturer is called ‘price-leader’ or ‘market leader’.

(b) Association of transporters announcing ‘bandh’ for their demand of abolition of octroi. It was held that ‘bandh’ is not a trade practice as it does not relate to carrying on trade as defined under MRTP Act. A bandh is stoppage of work. It cannot be reckoned as trade, business, industry or occupation.

(c) Parallelism in price by itself does not amount to RTP in absence of any evidence of cartel. *DGIR v. Coprihans India (2001) 45 CLA 9 (MRTPC) – following DGIR v. Alkali & Chemical Corporation (1993)1 CTJ 7 (MRTPC FB).

Essential elements of cartel – In DGIR v. Modi Alkali (2002) 51 CLA 93 (MRTPC), it was observed that three essential ingredients of cartel are:

1. Parity of prices
2. Agreement by way of concerted action suggesting conspiracy and
3. To gain monopoly or restrict or eliminate competition.

In Sumitomo Corporation In re (2001) 42 CLA 12 (MRTPC), it was held that carteisation imposes unjustified cost on consumers. Price fixing is illegal per se, therefore, further enquiry on the issue of intent or the anti-competition effect is not required.

Cartel by cement manufacturers – In Builders Association of India v. Cement Manufacturers’ Association (2012) 115 SCL taxmann.com 115 (Mag) (CCI), it was found that the cement manufacturers were limiting production and supplies and directly or indirectly determining price of cement in market. There was price parallelism which indicated collusive behaviour among cement companies. The cement companies were asked to deposit Rs. 6,300 crores within 90 days, and cease and desist order was issued.

In Alleged Cartelization by Cement Manufacturers, In re (2012) 116 SCL 648 = 27 taxmann.com 210 (CCI), also, it charge of cartelisation by cement manufacturers was upheld and penalty of Rs. 397.51 crores was imposed on the company found to be engaged in cartelisation.

Cartel by trade associations – Trade Association asking their members not to sell below the rates announced by it, with a threat of expulsion in the event of non compliance is ‘cartel’ – Madras Jewellers and Diamond Merchants’ Association (1994) 2 CTJ 198 (MRTPC).

In Retail Grain Dealers Association v. Bombay Kirana Colour & Chemical merchants Association (1996) 21 CLA 383 (MRTPC), circular of association directing its members to collect additional charges for service and packing and charge interest at specified rates for delayed payment was held to be an Restrictive Trade Practice (RTP).

Quoting identical rates despite differences in cost of production – In Bengal Tools Ltd. In re (1988) 63 Comp Cas 468 and Excel Industries Ltd. In re (1988) 64 Comp Cas 531, it has been held that quoting identical rates or prices even when cost of production varies is a presumption in favour of cartel and onus of disproving cartel shifts to the respondent. – quoted and followed in Alkali Manufacturers Association v. Sinochem International Chemical Co. Ltd. (1999) 33 CLA 27 (MRTPC).

Mere identical prices not sufficient to conclude cartel – In Director General (Investigation & Registration) v. Escorts Ltd. (2014) 126 SCL 262 = 42 taxmann.com 334 (CAT), it has been held that mere identical prices is not sufficient to come to conclusion of cartelization with a pre-concerted mind.

Airlines following price bands (bucket seats) is not anti-competitive – Airlines all over the world follow various price bands (bucket system) where seats are moved from lower price band to higher price band. This is not anti-competitive practice. It is not cartel – Domestic Airlines In re (2012) 111 SCL 732 = 18 taxmann.com 71 (CCI) and (2012) 112 SCL 72 = 18 taxmann.com 72 (CCI).

5.2 Protecting Inefficient Industry Is Not in Public Interest and in Such Cases ‘Cartel’ Is Permissible

In Haridas Exports v. All India Float Glass Mfgrs. Association 2002 AIR SCW 3077 = 145 ELT 241 = (2002) 6 SCC 600 = 111 Comp Cas 617 = AIR 2002 SC 2728 = 2002 CLC 1061 = 38 SCL 1020 (SC 3 member bench), it was held that MRTP Commission gets jurisdiction under section 37 of MRTP Act to pass an order, whether interim or final, only when it comes to conclusion that it is in public interest to do so. Public interest does not necessarily mean interest of only the industry. Unless and until it is demonstrated that an efficient Indian industry is facing closure or closure, MRTP Commission cannot pass an injunction for imports at predatory prices.

If the cartel is selling goods to India (at lower prices) and still making profit, it will not be in interest of general body of consumers in India to prevent import of such goods. The era of protectionism is now coming to an end. [Indeed the judgment reflects a new and fresh judicial thinking].

6. Agreement Which Shares the Market or Source of Production or Provision of Services

Agreement which shares the market or source of production or provision of services by way of allocation of geographical area of market, or type of goods or services, or number of customers in the market or any other similar way, is presumed to be anti-competitive – Section 3(3)(c) of Competition Act.

Cartel – ‘Cartel’ as discussed above, can get covered under this clause also.