[Analysis] Key Competition Law Rulings of 2025 | Top 15 Case Laws

The year 2025 marked a significant phase in the evolution of India's competition law jurisprudence. Courts and the Competition Commission of India delivered several landmark rulings that clarified key principles relating to abuse of dominance, anti-competitive agreements, merger control, and procedural safeguards under the Competition Act, 2002. These decisions not only shaped regulatory enforcement but also offered crucial guidance for businesses, legal practitioners, and compliance professionals navigating an increasingly complex market landscape. This article presents a curated review of the key competition law rulings of 2025, highlighting their facts, legal issues, and practical implications.

Table of Contents

1. Word ‘Shall’ u/s 29(1) Signifies SCN Must Be Issued on AAEC Concern; However, Referring Matter to DG Isn’t Mandatory: SC
2. A Resolution Plan Involving a Combination Needs CCI Approval Before CoC Consideration, as Required u/s 31(4) of IBC: SC
3. Section 26(2A) Does Not Create Any Jurisdictional Embargo on CCI to Entertain a Representation If the Same Is Different From the Earlier One: HC
4. Levy of Interest by CCI Without a Valid Demand Notice Is Without Jurisdiction and Contrary to Law: HC
5. Secured Creditor’s Challenge to Resolution Plan Dismissed as Proposed Merger Wasn’t a ‘Combination’ Under the Competition Act
6. Penalty on Google for Abuse of Dominance in the Market for Licensable Mobile OS Should Apply on Relevant Turnover, Not Total Turnover: NCLAT
7. Misrepresentation of Surgeon’s Qualifications and False Advertising by a Hospital Didn’t Amount to Anti-Competitive Conduct: CCI
8. WhatsApp Abused Dominance Under the Competition Act by Coercing User Consent for Data Sharing; Penalty on Meta Upheld: CCI
9. No Prima Facie Abuse of Dominance by Google in Developer Account Termination as Procedures and Rationale Found Reasonable: CCI
10. No Abuse of Dominance by Microsoft Due to the Presence of Many Antivirus Developers Offering New Features and Enhanced Services: CCI
11. SC Upheld Penalty Imposed Upon Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation and Others by CCI for Threatening to Ban Screening of Films in Theatres
12. Appeals Seeking Restoration of CCI’s Penalty on Schott India for Abuse of Dominance Were Dismissed as No Contravention Was Proved
13. CCI Closed the Case Against Nestlé as Allegations of Dirty Water and False Labelling Are Food Safety Issues Rather Than Competition Concerns
14. No Prima Facie Case u/s 4 Against Zomato as Charges Like Food Price, Platform Fee and Tip Were Not Unfair or Discriminatory
15. NCLAT Allows CCI’s Application Seeking Correction of an Inadvertent Error in NCLT’s Order, as It Did Not Amount to a Review

In 2025, Indian competition law witnessed several landmark rulings that clarified the scope and limits of enforcement under the Competition Act, 2002. The Supreme Court of India, the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, and the Competition Commission of India addressed key issues relating to merger control, abuse of dominance, cartelisation, penalties, and procedural safeguards. These decisions settled important questions on mandatory show-cause notices, prior CCI approval for combinations, limits on penalties and interest, and competition assessment in digital markets. Together, they provide much-needed clarity on regulatory powers and due process, guiding businesses and practitioners in navigating India’s competition law framework.

1. Word ‘Shall’ u/s 29(1) Signifies SCN Must Be Issued on AAEC Concern; However, Referring Matter to DG Isn’t Mandatory: SC

Competition Commission of India vs. Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. [2025] 175 taxmann.com 20 (SC)

In the present case, the question placed before the Supreme Court was whether the word ‘shall’ used in section 29(1) of the Competition Act, 2002, requires issuance of a show-cause notice (SCN) for an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) and whether referring the matter to the Director General (DG) is mandatory.

The Supreme Court observed that the word ‘shall’ used in section 29(1) of the Competition Act, 2002, makes it mandatory for the CCI to issue a show-cause notice (SCN) to the parties if it finds an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) from a proposed combination.

At the same time, in view of the word ‘may’, the Commission is not under any obligation to necessarily send the matter to DG for further investigation and, therefore, words in sections 29(1) and 29(1A) of the Act are mandatory and directory respectively.

The Supreme Court held that the Competition Commission, being an Expert Body, decides on the course of action to be followed by the Commission after receiving a response to the SCN, and that it is not always necessary to escalate verification to the DG for investigation under Section 29(1A) of the Act.

In a majority judgment, it was held that upon formation of a prima facie opinion by the CCI that a combination has AAEC, the CCI is under an obligation to issue a show cause notice to the parties. Thereafter, the CCI must call for a report from DG under section 29(1A) of the Act.

Thus, the view taken in the majority judgment was contrary to the plain construction of sections 29(1) and 29(1A) of the Act. Therefore, the view taken in the majority judgment was to be reviewed and substituted.

2. A Resolution Plan Involving a Combination Needs CCI Approval Before CoC Consideration, as Required u/s 31(4) of IBC: SC

Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. vs. Girish Sriram Juneja [2025] 170 taxmann.com 868 (SC)

In the instant case, the Supreme Court ruled that a resolution plan involving a combination requires prior approval from the Competition Commission of India (CCI) before the Committee of Creditors (CoC) can consider and approve it, as mandated under section 31(4) of the IBC.

The CIRP was initiated against the corporate debtor, and resolution plans were submitted by the appellant (unsuccessful resolution applicant) and AGI (successful resolution applicant).

The AGI’s acquisition of a corporate debtor would create an 80-85 per cent market share in the F&B segment and 45-50 per cent in the alco-beverage segment, raising anti-competition concerns. The appellant objected to CoC’s approval of AGI’s resolution plan, citing a lack of prior CCI clearance, as required under section 31(4) of the IBC.

Despite objections, the CoC approved AGI’s plan with 98% of the vote. The CCI approval was obtained only later, subject to divestment conditions. The NCLT upheld CoC’s approval, citing subsequent compliance. The NCLAT upheld the said decision, ruling that prior CCI approval was directory, not mandatory. Thereafter, an appeal was made before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court noted that a resolution plan involving a combination requires prior CCI approval before the CoC approval, as mandated under section 31(4) of the IBC.

Further, the Supreme Court noted that section 29(1) of the Competition Act mandates the issuance of a Show Cause Notice (SCN) to the parties to the combination if the CCI forms a prima facie opinion that the combination is likely to cause, or has caused, AAEC in the relevant market.

The Supreme Court held that the CCI’s failure to issue a mandatory SCN under section 29(1) of the Act to all the affected parties, including the corporate debtor, constituted a major procedural lapse. Further, the AGI’s resolution plan, lacking prior CCI clearance, violated sections 30 and 34 of the IBC and, therefore, being legally unsustainable, had to be set aside.

3. Section 26(2A) Does Not Create Any Jurisdictional Embargo on CCI to Entertain a Representation If the Same Is Different From the Earlier One: HC

Asian Paints Ltd. vs. Competition Commission of India [2025] 178 taxmann.com 417 (HC-Bombay)

In the present case, the High Court clarified that Section 26(2A) of the Competition Act does not create a jurisdictional embargo on the CCI from entertaining a representation if the representation is found to be different from the earlier one.

The petitioner was engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of paints, coatings, home decor products, and bath fittings, as well as in providing related services.

The Respondent No. 2, a new entrant in the decorative paints market, filed a complaint against the petitioner, alleging that the petitioner abused its dominance in the market.

The Respondent No. 1 – CCI, without affording any hearing to the petitioner, passed the impugned order directing DG to cause an investigation into the matter. The petitioner contended that in an earlier case initiated by ‘JSW’ and ‘Balaji’, based on similar information, alleging abuse of dominance and anti-competitive vertical agreements, the CCI had found no evidence of abuse of dominance by the petitioner despite a thorough investigation.

The petitioner also requested an opportunity to present its case and supporting evidence through an oral hearing. The petitioner submitted that under the provisions of section 26(2-A) of the Competition Act, the CCI was jurisdictionally barred from entertaining respondent No. 2’s complaint on the same or substantially the same facts and issues, once the same allegations made by ‘JSW’ and ‘Balaji’ were already decided by the CCI in its previous orders.

It was noted that section 26(2-A) of the Act does not create any jurisdictional embargo on the CCI to entertain a representation, if the representation is found distinct/different from an earlier representation.

In the instant case, the sections under which Respondent No.2 filed its complaint, i.e., the provisions invoked, were not the same as those invoked in the ‘JSW’ case. Moreover, the CCI was fully conscious of the earlier representation made by JSW/Balaji and its dismissal.

The High Court held that there is no inherent right of hearing, oral/written, vested in the party at the stage of formation of a prima facie opinion, and whether or not to afford such a hearing is a matter of discretion with the CCI, guided by the facts and circumstances of each case.

The High Court further held that the order under Section 26 of the Act is administrative in nature and, prima facie, the High Court is not competent to adjudicate the validity of such an order. Thus, there was no infirmity in the impugned order passed by the CCI under Section 26(1) of the Act and accordingly, the instant petition was to be dismissed.

4. Levy of Interest by CCI Without a Valid Demand Notice Is Without Jurisdiction and Contrary to Law: HC

Competition Commission of India vs. Geep Industries [2025] 180 taxmann.com 268 (HC-Delhi)

In the instant case, proceedings under the Competition Act were initiated against the Respondent Company and its Directors. Upon completion of the inquiry, the CCI found respondents guilty of engaging in cartelisation in the Dry Cell Batteries market in India, in violation of the provisions of Section 3(3)(a) read with Section 3(1) of the Competition Act, 2002.

Consequently, respondents were directed to cease and desist from such anti-competitive conduct, and monetary penalties were imposed under Section 27(b) of the Act. The said order was received by the respondents on 10.09.2018. The NCLAT upheld the finding of contravention but reduced the quantum of penalty imposed. Upon vacation of stay orders by the NCLAT, the CCI issued Demand Notices to respondents under Regulation 3 of the CCI (Manner of Recovery of Monetary Penalty) Regulations, 2011.

By these notices, respondents were directed to deposit the penalty amounts within 30 days, with an interest rate of 1.5% per month on the delayed payment of the penalty, calculated from 10.12.2018. The Single Judge, vide the impugned order, set aside the CCI’s Order to the extent it imposed interest on the penalty amounts from 10.12.2018.

The High Court observed that the issuance of a demand notice under Regulation 3 and consequent imposition of interest for default under Regulation 5 form part of a sequential and mandatory statutory process. Further, these provisions nowhere empower the CCI to impose interest retrospectively or from a date preceding the valid service of a demand notice.

The High Court held that the CCI’s assumption that interest accrues by operation of law after the penalty order’s period expires was wholly misplaced and unsupported by the statutory scheme.

Further, the High Court held that the Single Judge had rightly held that in the absence of a valid demand notice under Regulation 3, levy of interest by the CCI was without jurisdiction and contrary to the mandatory procedural scheme of the 2011 Regulations.

5. Secured Creditor’s Challenge to Resolution Plan Dismissed as Proposed Merger Wasn’t a ‘Combination’ Under the Competition Act

Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd. vs. ASC Insolvency Services LLP [2025] 174 taxmann.com 914 (NCLAT-New Delhi)

In the instant case, the CIRP was initiated against the corporate debtor. The appellant, being a secured financial creditor of the corporate debtor, filed its claim in response to the public announcement and was included as a member of the Committee of Creditors (CoC).

The CoC approved the resolution plan submitted by the respondent no. 2 with a 73.38% voting share. The appellant filed an appeal challenging the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority approving the resolution plan submitted by the respondent no. 2.

The appellant contended that the proposed acquisition of the corporate debtor through a composite scheme of merger and demerger in the resolution plan constituted a combination under section 5 of the Competition Act.

Further, obtaining CCI approval for a combination was a mandatory condition, and since no such approval had been obtained, the approval of the resolution plan was contrary to the provisions of section 5 of the Competition Act.

It was noted, however, that in terms of the Notification dated 7-3-2024, section 5 of the Competition Act would not apply for a period of two years where the value of assets being acquired, taken control of, merged or amalgamated did not exceed Rs. 450 crores in India or where the turnover did not exceed Rs. 1250 crores in India.

The NCLAT held that, since the value of the corporate debtor fell within the exemption provided under the Notification dated 7-3-2024, section 5 of the Competition Act was not applicable. Therefore, no prior approval from the CCI was required. Accordingly, the appellant’s submission could not be accepted.

6. Penalty on Google for Abuse of Dominance in the Market for Licensable Mobile OS Should Apply on Relevant Turnover, Not Total Turnover: NCLAT

Alphabet Inc. vs. Competition Commission of India [2025] 173 taxmann.com 29 (NCLAT-New Delhi)

In the instant case, the CCI, by the impugned order, held that Google had contravened the provisions of section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, by imposing unfair and discriminatory conditions on app developers.

The CCI held that Google had abused its dominant position by making use of Google Play’s Billing System (GPBS) exclusive and mandatory for processing payments for apps and in-app purchases.

The CCI also held that Google had violated section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act, by engaging in discriminatory practices as it did not use GPBS for its own application, i.e., YouTube. A penalty was accordingly imposed on Google for violating Section 4 of the Act. Thereafter, Google filed an instant appeal challenging the CCI’s order.

It was noted that Google, by requiring app developers to use Google Play (GPBS), had imposed a discriminatory condition in the sale of goods and services, thereby violating Section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act.

The NCLAT observed that payments made through Google Play via GPBS accounted for less than 1%. Therefore, the Commission’s finding that Google had restricted or limited technical or scientific development in the market for payment processors/aggregators could not be sustained.

The NCLAT held that the practices followed by Google, which made developers dependent on Google to access users on its platform, resulted in leveraging its dominance in the market for licensable mobile OS and app stores for Android OS, to protect its position in downstream markets, in violation of section 4(2)(e) of the Act.

Therefore, the penalty imposed by the CCI on Google’s entire turnover was held to be unsustainable and ought to have been imposed only on the relevant turnover.

7. Misrepresentation of Surgeon’s Qualifications and False Advertising by a Hospital Didn’t Amount to Anti-Competitive Conduct: CCI

Moses Pinto, In re [2025] 172 taxmann.com 675 (CCI)

In the instant case, the Informant was admitted to the OP hospital with the symptoms indicative of acute appendicitis under the care of surgeon ‘J’. The Informant underwent a laparoscopic appendectomy, which was performed by surgeon Dr R.

Following the surgery, the Informant experienced severe complications, including persistent abdominal pain and signs of infection, ultimately leading to the development of an enterocutaneous fistula – a connection between the small intestine and the abdominal wall. The Informant was subsequently referred to another hospital for further treatment.

During a second corrective surgery, it was discovered that a portion of the appendix and a fecalith had been left behind during the initial operation at the OP hospital. This necessitated the resection of approximately 10 cm of the Informant’s small intestine to rectify the damage caused by the first surgery. The Informant thereafter filed a complaint with the Goa Medical Council alleging negligence.

During the disciplinary inquiry proceedings, it was revealed that the doctor who performed the surgery on the Informant did not possess a valid registration with the Goa Medical Council at the time of the procedure, in contravention of the National Medical Commission Act, 2019.

The Informant also filed information against the OP hospital alleging contravention of the provisions of sections 3 and 4 of the Competition Act, 2002.

The Informant alleged that the OP hospital deliberately misrepresented Dr R’s qualifications and engaged in false advertising, thereby misleading consumers, distorting the market in its favour and gaining an unfair competitive advantage over other compliant healthcare providers.

The CCI held that the alleged misrepresentation of the surgeon’s qualifications and the engagement in false advertising by the OP hospital did not raise any competition issues under the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, no prima facie case of contravention of the provisions of the Act was made, and therefore, no investigation was warranted.

8. WhatsApp Abused Dominance Under the Competition Act by Coercing User Consent for Data Sharing; Penalty on Meta Upheld: CCI

WhatsApp LLC vs. Competition Commission of India [2025] 180 taxmann.com 126 (NCLAT)

In the instant case, the NCLAT upheld the penalty of Rs 213.14 crore imposed on Meta Platforms and WhatsApp, holding that the CCI had correctly established abuse of dominance and imposed a proportionate fine.

The appeals arose from the CCI’s order dated 18-11-2024, which, following a detailed DG investigation into WhatsApp’s 2021 Privacy Policy update, found contraventions under section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002 and imposed monetary penalty and conduct remedies.

WhatsApp’s 2021 update, which mandated users to accept revised privacy terms, led the CCI to conclude that WhatsApp had abused its dominant position under sections 4(2)(a)(i), 4(2)(c) and 4(2)(e) of the Act. The CCI determined that the update compelled users to accept unfair terms on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis, under threat of losing access to the service and imposed a penalty of Rs 213.14 crore.

The appellants, Meta Platforms and WhatsApp, challenged the CCI’s order on the ground that issues relating to data-sharing, user consent and privacy fell within the domain of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 (DPDP Act) and the SPDI Rules, and were therefore outside the jurisdiction of the CCI.

The NCLAT rejected this contention, holding that competition law and data protection laws are complementary, not mutually exclusive. Privacy laws safeguard personal data while competition law curbs abuse of dominance through exploitative data practices.

Hence, the mere overlap does not bar the CCI’s jurisdiction; its competence to examine competition harms linked with privacy issues has already been upheld by the Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court.

The Tribunal upheld the CCI’s delineation of:

(i) the market for OTT messaging apps through smartphones in India and

(ii) the market for online display advertising in India. It noted that the CCI had undertaken a detailed assessment of user behaviour, technological features, and market structure, recognising the core market as OTT messaging apps on smartphones, in line with economic realities shaped by consumer preferences and switching costs.

Further, the NCLAT noted that CCI also analysed functional substitutability and proximity of competitors, distinguishing WhatsApp’s position within a distinct digital messaging app market that includes rivals like Telegram and Signal, alongside a complementary online display advertising market, both relevant for assessing dominance and abuse.

The NCLAT upheld the CCI’s finding that WhatsApp’s 2021 Privacy Policy amounted to an abuse of dominance under section 4(2)(a)(i) of the Act, as it imposed unfair and coercive conditions on users and undermined free consent.

However, the Tribunal held that the finding of abuse under section 4(2)(e) was not sustainable as there was no clear proof of leveraging conduct distinct from other established abuses. Further, it upheld the findings under sections 4(2)(a)(i) and 4(2)(c), as they were directly related to coercive data-sharing requirements and market foreclosure.

Also, the Tribunal held that the ‘cease and desist’ directions issued by the CCI lacked sustainability and were required to be set aside, while the remaining directions and the monetary penalty were to be upheld.

9. No Prima Facie Abuse of Dominance by Google in Developer Account Termination as Procedures and Rationale Found Reasonable: CCI

Liberty Infospace (P.) Ltd. vs. Alphabet Inc [2025] 179 taxmann.com 167 (CCI)

In the instant case, the Informant, engaged in the business of developing and maintaining the digital app ‘EasyDo Tasks–HRMS Payroll AI’, entered into a ‘Google Play Developer Distribution Agreement’ (GPDDA) with OP-Google to list its app on the Play Store.

Accordingly, the Informant’s developer account was created on the Google Play Console. However, the Informant alleged that Google terminated the developer’s account without prior notice or fair warning.

The Informant filed information before the CCI alleging abuse of dominance by Google through one-sided standard terms and policies, arbitrary and undefined ‘related account’ linkage, automated enforcement without clear criteria, lack of proportionality between violations and enforcement, absence of fair warning, and inadequate redressal mechanisms compared with those available in the EU.

It was noted that Google terminated the Informant’s account in accordance with its policy, as set out in the GPDDP. Further, Google’s explanation regarding its ‘relational ban policy’, the reasons for not providing detailed disclosures, the rationale behind the termination, and the lack of incentive to terminate authentic apps appeared reasonable.

Google’s explanation of its appeals process and the availability of the same redressal mechanism across all jurisdictions (except the EU) also appeared to satisfy the test of reasonableness.

The CCI observed that the combination of automation and human effort in deciding such appeals could not be said to be unfair or discriminatory per se. Since the allegations pertained to abuse of dominant position by Google vis-à-vis app developers, the relevant market was delineated as the ‘market for app stores for Android OS in India’.

Further, the CCI observed that, prima facie, Google held a dominant position vis-à-vis app developers in the said relevant market. However, in relation to the termination of the Informant’s developer account and the disposal of appeals by Google, no abusive or discriminatory conduct was made out.

The CCI held that no prima facie case of contravention of the provisions of section 4 of the Act was made out against Google. Accordingly, the Information was to be closed in terms of the provisions contained in section 26(2) of the Act.

10. No Abuse of Dominance by Microsoft Due to the Presence of Many Antivirus Developers Offering New Features and Enhanced Services: CCI

XYZ, In re [2025] 172 taxmann.com 141 (CCI)

In the instant case, Microsoft-OP was the world’s largest and leading developer of personal-computer software systems and applications and was best known for its software products, including the Microsoft Windows Operating Systems (Windows OS), Microsoft Office suite, etc.

The Informant filed information against Microsoft, inter alia, alleging a contravention of the provisions of section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. It was alleged that Microsoft had illegally hindered the development and market access of rival security software developers by tying and bundling its own security software, Microsoft Defender, with the Windows Operating System.

It was further alleged that Microsoft had illegally hindered development and denied market access to rival security software developers by making membership of the Microsoft Virus Initiative (MVI) compulsory for listing on the Microsoft Store and for ensuring smooth functionality on the Windows OS.

It was noted that numerous antivirus software developers were active in the market, and each of these providers routinely introduced new features and enhanced their offerings to provide better services to customers.

This ongoing innovation in the sector indicated that the inclusion of Microsoft Defender had not stifled technological advancement or deterred competition activity. Accordingly, the allegations against Microsoft in respect of any actual or potential impediment to technical or scientific development appeared to be largely speculative and unsupported by evidence and prima facie, no violation of Section 4(2)(b)(ii) of the Act was established.

The CCI further noted that independent developers specialised in antivirus software development, indicating a distinct consumer demand and, thus, the existence of a separate market for antivirus solutions.

The CCI held that, despite the presence of Microsoft’s built-in security software, multiple well-established and prominent players continued to operate in the market without facing significant barriers to entry or exclusion. Therefore, there existed no prima facie case of contravention of the provisions of section 4 of the Act and the information filed was directed to be closed under section 26(2) of the Act.

11. SC Upheld Penalty Imposed Upon Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation and Others by CCI for Threatening to Ban Screening of Films in Theatres

Competition Commission of India vs. Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation [2025] 178 taxmann.com 649 (SC)

In the instant case, the Informant-theatre alleged that the respondent federation threatened to ban the screening of films at the Informant’s theatre. DG found the federation contravened section 3(3) of the Competition Act, 2002, and identified its President and General Secretary as key persons personally involved. The Commission forwarded DG’s report to them, directing them to reply and appear.

The Commission found the federation in violation, held the President/General Secretary liable under section 48, and imposed penalties under section 27 of the Act. The Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT) upheld the contravention against the federation but set aside penalties on the President/General Secretary for lack of specific notice.

It was noted that DG, who investigated the complaint, concluded that the respondent contravened section 3(3) of the Act, causing appreciable adverse effects on competition. The Report also, by name, found respondents Nos. 2 and 3 as key persons/decision-makers who played an active role in the respondent.

It was also undisputed that appellant, by its order, upon consideration of the DG Report, forwarded the Report to respondent Nos . 2 and 3, with a direction to file their replies.

The Supreme Court observed that no second SCN was needed after the DG’s report indicating contravention of the Competition Act. Further, since a clear opportunity to file reply/objections was given, the notice issued by the Commission to the respondents satisfied the legal requirement for imposing a penalty under section 27 of the Act.

The Supreme Court held that since the penalty imposed by the Commission on the respondents was not disproportionate, the appeal against the impugned order of COMPAT was to be allowed and the findings of the Commission were to be restored in their entirety.

12. Appeals Seeking Restoration of CCI’s Penalty on Schott India for Abuse of Dominance Were Dismissed as No Contravention Was Proved

Competition Commission of India vs. Schott Glass India (P.) Ltd. [2025] 174 taxmann.com 521 (SC)

In the instant case, Schott India (the respondent) was the principal domestic manufacturer of neutral USP-I borosilicate glass tubing. KG, a converter of pharmaceutical containers, filed information alleging that Schott India had abused its dominant position by offering exclusionary volume-based discounts, imposing discriminatory contractual terms, and, on certain occasions, refusing to supply.

The CCI, by the majority order, levied a penalty at a rate of 4 per cent of Schott India’s average turnover for three years and also issued a cease-and-desist order restraining Schott India from engaging in discriminatory practices against any converter.

The Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT), by the impugned order, allowed Schott India’s appeal, set aside the penalty, and held that the evidentiary material did not establish abuse of dominant position.

The Supreme Court observed that Schott India held a dominant position in the upstream market for the manufacture and sale of neutral USP-I borosilicate glass tubing. However, the slab-based target-rebate scheme did not impose unfair or discriminatory conditions and the 8 per cent functional rebate, whether in its original or TMLA form, was objectively justified and uniformly available.

The Supreme Court held that the Long-Term Technical Supply Agreement (LTTSA) with Schott Kaisha neither resulted in a margin squeeze nor foreclosed downstream rivals, and that no coercion or tying between NGA and NGC tubes was proved. There was no appreciable adverse effect on competition in the instant case.

The Supreme Court further held that the investigation conducted by the DG was vitiated due to the denial of cross-examination and reliance on pre-statute material, which constituted a procedural lapse sufficient, by itself, to invalidate the CCI’s findings. Consequently, the appeals against COMPAT’s order were to be dismissed.

13. CCI Closed the Case Against Nestlé as Allegations of Dirty Water and False Labelling Are Food Safety Issues Rather Than Competition Concerns

Sarvesh M. Kolumbkar vs. Nestlé India Ltd. [2025] 179 taxmann.com 212 (CCI)

In the instant case, the Informant had alleged that the OP/Nestlé India Bicholim Goa Factory, which was involved inter alia in the manufacturing of Maggi Sauce, had been using dirty water extracted through a pump from an under-construction site for the production of Maggi Sauce.

The informant further alleged that, by affixing false labels on the Maggi Sauce bottles, the OP had cheated the Indian consumers and deprived them of their right to clean, healthy and hygienic food.

The Informant had submitted that the highly objectionable production process adopted by the OP in the manufacturing of Maggi Sauce violated the provisions of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, and the Rules and Regulations framed thereunder. However, no legal action had been taken by the Directorate of Food and Drugs Administration, Goa, in this regard.

The Informant alleged that, by adopting highly objectionable production processes and by sticking false labels on Maggi Sauce bottles, the OP had violated the provisions of section 4 of the Act.

Based on the aforesaid facts and allegations, the Informant had prayed before the Commission to incentivise him, if any such provision existed, for pursuing the alleged Nestlé Maggi Sauce scam for the past 15 years. The Informant had also filed an Interlocutory Application seeking interim relief under section 33 of the Act, requesting the Commission to scrutinise and investigate the alleged Maggi Sauce scam and the officials involved therein.

Additionally, the Informant requested the Commission to bar all the certification bodies from issuing any further certificates.

The CCI held that the alleged conduct primarily related to violations of food, health and safety standards did not fall within the ambit of the Act. Further, the CCI held that there was no competition issue arising out of the present case and thus, the matter was to be closed under the provisions of Section 26(2) of the Act. Consequently, no case for the grant of interim reliefs as sought under Section 33 of the Act was made out, and the same was also rejected.

14. No Prima Facie Case u/s 4 Against Zomato as Charges Like Food Price, Platform Fee and Tip Were Not Unfair or Discriminatory

Lalit Wadher vs. Zomato Ltd. [2025] 176 taxmann.com 396 (CCI)

In the instant case, the Informant was a senior citizen, and the OP, i.e., Zomato, was a mobile application-based food delivery company operating out of Gurugram, Haryana. The app was inter alia used for ordering food online from restaurants and eateries. The Informant had ordered food through the app three times in the past.

The Informant filed information against the OP alleging that it charged inflated prices for food on its platform, levied platform and other fees, failed to ensure the edibility of delivered food, did not disclose the timing of payments made to restaurants, and thus earned profits from treasury operations.

It was further alleged that the OP operated as a duopoly along with another similar company, with no effective competition in the market. However, the Informant did not provide any data or evidence in this regard.

The OP was stated to offer free deliveries to customers who purchased subscription packages on its app. It was further alleged that a 20 per cent increase in platform charges was not based on any improvement in software, addition of facilities or enhancement of consumer experience.

As per the Informant, the OP delivered the food items to consumers and received payment for the same, which made it a seller. Therefore, OP was required to undertake all the duties and responsibilities of a seller under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, including obligations relating to disclosure, warranty, quantity, fitness and delivery.

The CCI observed that the Informant had made an allegation that OP is running as a duopoly along with a similar company without any other competition in the market, but has not provided any data/evidence in this regard. On perusal of the allegations, which largely pertained to the levy of various kinds of charges, viz., food charges, platform fees, delivery fees, tips, etc., by OP, the Commission was of the view that these charges did not appear to be unfair or discriminatory in nature.

Further, the CCI observed that the Informant also appears to be aggrieved that he could not find any option to opt out of the default setting of payment of tips. However, the Commission noted that payment of tips was not mandatory and that the option to decline the same was easily visible on the app.

The CCI also noted that the Informant had raised issues relating to the edibility of delivered food, non-disclosure of food prices as per restaurants’ menus on the packaging and non-disclosure of the timing of payments made by the OP to restaurants.

The CCI held that these allegations did not appear to raise any competition concerns. Accordingly, no prima facie case of contravention of the provisions of Section 4 of the Act was made out against the OP.

15. NCLAT Allows CCI’s Application Seeking Correction of an Inadvertent Error in NCLT’s Order, as It Did Not Amount to a Review

Alphabet Inc. vs. Competition Commission of India [2025] 174 taxmann.com 1210 (NCLAT-New Delhi)

In the instant case, the application was filed by the respondent-CCI, praying for correction of an inadvertent mistake in the operative portion of the NCLT’s order, specifically paragraph 107(iii).

According to the respondent, in the said order, the NCLT, while dealing with directions under 395.1 to 395.8 in para 93 of the body of judgment, held that directions contained under paragraphs 395.4 and 395.5 related to findings of violation of section 4(2)(e) of the Competition Act, 2002, and that those directions were sustained.

However, in the operative portion of the order, the directions issued in paragraphs 395.4 and 395.5 were set aside. It was the case of the appellant that the relief sought in the application amounted to a review, which was not permissible in law. It was also contended that it is settled law that the operative portion of an order must be in consonance with the body of the judgment.

The NCLAT observed that, in paragraph 93 of the judgment, it was already held that the ‘directions under paragraphs 395.4 and 395.5 related to findings of violation of Section 4(2)(e) were sustained’. Hence, the order to set aside the said directions 395.4 and 395.5 was obviously an inadvertent error, which needs to be corrected.

Further, the present case was not one where the respondent was asking for a review of the judgment, but was asking for the correction of an inadvertent error that did not amount to a review of the judgment. Therefore, the instant application was to be allowed.

The NCLAT held that, in paragraph 107(iii) of the order, the words’ directions issued in paragraphs 395.3, 395.4, 395.5 395.6 and 395.7 are set aside’ be substituted, with ‘directions issued in paragraphs 395.4 and 395.5 are sustained, and the directions contained in paragraphs 395.6 and 395.7 are set aside’.