In a cabinet system of polity, the process of the formation of the Government & dissolution of the House is an easy exercise for the Presidency till a political party obtains a majority in the House of Representatives, but the Constitution of the country passes through an impasse in case of fractured mandate, where “no single political party obtains a clear cut majority in the general election”. In such political scenario the Parliamentary system of Governments faces crisis as it becomes a cumbersome exercise for the Presidency to invite a politician to form the Government because it becomes difficult to ascertain as to whether he would be in a position to command the confidence in the House of Representatives.
Thus, in the state of Hung Legislatures, the neat conceptual symmetry of Parliamentary regimes that provides responsive yet authoritative Governments faces challenges of frequent fall of Governments on the premature dissolution of the House of Representatives. This situation faces a difficulty of stability of Government, as the Parliamentary system of democracy prefers ’responsiveness’ over ’stability’.
The world of democracy strives for the solutions to meet such situations of Hung Legislatures and the Constitution of a democratic regime is always under the threats of debacle of premature elections due to frequent fall of minority or coalitional Governments. French Constitution is a glaring example as its Parliaments were ill-famous with name of ’House of Musical Chairs’ and failed due to such political scenario of Hung Legislatures which all multi-party Governments frequently suffer or are under the threats of such situations.
This book, based on a Comparative survey of world’s Constitutions is an attempt to search the conditions conducive to secure responsive yet durable Government under the cabinet system of polity. In the process, it deals with the concepts of majority, coalitions defections and the discretions, if any, lying with the Head of the State to deal with impasse of Hung Legislatures.